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THE RETURN TO LOCHNERISM?
THE REVIVAL OF ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
FROM DAVID TO GOLIATH*
INTRODUCTION
"To work means to eat. It also means to live .... The great values of
freedom are in the opportunities afforded man to press to new horizons,
to pit his strength against the forces of nature, to match skills with his
fellow man. "I
The tumultuous jurisprudence enveloping the concept of economic
liberties strikes to the core of individuals' survival, in the context Jus-
tice William Douglas suggested, as well as to the heart of any corpora-
tion's financial stability. Rather than finding themselves struggling
against the forces of nature to secure economic status, these entities
often must pit their economic survival against state regulations seek-
ing to limit or prohibit their rights. Those seeking refuge find little
comfort in the constitutional provisions apparently drafted to protect
against such infringements. These provisions have been spun into a
quagmire of convoluted jurisprudence so entangled that some jurists
have suggested their elimination.2
Three general provisions masquerade as guidance in defining eco-
nomic rights. The Fourteenth Amendment provides both the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause 3 while the
Fifth Amendment establishes the Takings Clause.4 However, history
has been unkind to the development of these constitutional provi-
* I received the idea for this Comment from an American Bar Association Journal article
noting recent constitutional developments toward increased protection of economic liberties.
See Steve France, Dusty Doctrines. 87 A.B.A. J. 46 (2001).
1. Barskv v. Bd. of Regents. 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J.. dissenting). See Robert G.
NcCloskev, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhionation and Reburial. 1962
Su,. Ci. REv. 34 (quoting Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion).
2. See John Harrison. Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 101 YALE L.J. 1385
(1992) (stating Judge Robert Bork's suggestion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should
be treated as though "obscured by an ink blot." because no agreement has ever been reached on
the provision's meaning).
3. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV. § I (providing that "[no state shall make or enforce any' law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States: nor shall any
State deprive any person of life. liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
4. U.S. CONsi. amend. V (stating, in relevant part, --nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation").
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sions, and the resulting precedent has been confusing and contradic-
tory. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was effectively nullified
almost from its beginning. 5 In contrast, substance was read into the
Due Process Clause, producing individual and corporate protection
against economic regulation for a number of years before the Court
eliminated this rationale. 6 Additionally, the Court has subjected the
Takings Clause to a cycle of upheavals and reconfigurations, resulting
in a confusing array of precedent and no strong footing for redress of
regulatory takings.
Fortunately, recent case law has reflected the Court's reconsidera-
tion of its previous hastiness in the area of economic rights during the
preceding century. While Saenz v. Roe7 restored the possibility of
practical weight to the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the first
time in 130 years, lower courts have been reconsidering substantive
due process rationales, as reflected in Craigmiles v. Giles.8 In addi-
tion, regulatory takings claims have been at the forefront of jurispru-
dence in actions for corporate protection from economic regulations,
as evidenced by the recent Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly decision.9
To resolve further inconsistencies raised by these recent develop-
ments in economic rights, this Comment analyzes the Court's contra-
dictory historical analysis and investigates recent developments
suggesting yet another shift in the law. Part II will provide back-
ground on the Court's historical development of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due Process
Clause as well as the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause."' In addition,
an in-depth analysis of the Saenz decision and the trends suggested by
Craigmiles and Phillip Morris will be conducted." Part III will ex-
amine implications of the Saenz, Craigmiles, and Phillip Morris deci-
sions, both within the specific legal framework in which the cases were
decided as well as the interrelation between the economic rights ar-
eas. 12 This analysis will also establish the strain placed on the Due
Process Clause because of the virtual eradication of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and highlight how the Saenz decision may help al-
5. Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause does not protect state citizens against their own state's actions).
6. See infra notes 71-128 and accompanying text.
7. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
8. 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000): affd. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24637 (6th Cir. 2002).
9. 267 F.3d 45 (ist Cir. 2001) (opinion withdrawn): rehearing en banc 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
(1st Cir. 2002).
10. See infra notes 15-158 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 159-304 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 305-677 and accompanying text.
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leviate that burden. Furthermore, Part III will examine use of the
Takings Clause as an alternative for the nullified Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Part IV will investigate plausible remedies to restore weight to
economic rights while avoiding the Lochner era "evils" that caused
the judiciary to avoid entering this area for years. 13 Part V will con-
clude that increased reliance on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
and the Takings Clause is necessary to restore protective strength and
credibility to the economic liberties of individuals and corporations.14
II. BACKGROUND
Of the three clauses relied upon to protect economic liberties, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause suffered the swiftest demise, effecting
its virtual eradication from the outset. 15 The Supreme Court virtually
wrote the clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-
House Cases'6 only seven years after its enactment. Despite strong
dissent,' 7 the majority opinion effectively limited the applicability of
the clause to a few rights of national citizenship.' 8 Faced with the ob-
literation of protection of their privileges and immunities, individuals
sought establishment of their economic liberties in the Due Process
Clause. Courts soon followed suit.
The subsequent area of substantive due process law created by the
Court has been wholly inconsistent and contradictory. During the rise
of economic due process and in its heyday, the Court struck hundreds
of state regulations upon the premise that the Due Process Clause
carried substantive implications. 19 However, affording content to the
Due Process Clause created a breadth of values not found in the text
of the Constitution. 20 Thus, it was a matter of time before objections
13. See infra notes 678-711 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 568 and accompanying text.
15. As used in this paper. economic liberties refer mainly to business and property rights of
individuals and businesses that are affected by governmental economic regulations. For exam-
ple. price regulations. labor relations, and business conditions are basic economic rights that are
often in dispute. GERALD GUNTHER ET AL., CONS1iTIiONAi LAW 465 (13th ed. 1997). One
classic example is the Lochner v. New York bakery owners' rights to employ workers for more
than ten hours a day or sixty hours a week. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
17. Id. (Field, J.. dissenting) (countering that the Fourteenth Amendment does protect U.S.
citizens against deprivation by a state and arguing that the Amendment would be "vain and idle"
if it included protection of only those rights adopted before enactment).
18. Id.
19. See generally Coppage v. Kansas. 236 U.S. 1 (1915): Adair v. United States. 208 U.S. 161
(1908): Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905): Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
20. Allgeyer exemplifies some of the values created. In a unanimous decision, the Court cre-
ated the right deemed "liberty of contract" by stating that the liberty referred to in the Four-
teenth Amendment included:
2002]
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to the interventionist Court grew within both the legislative and exec-
utive branches. Faced with a national economic depression and the
legislature's subsequent need to regulate, the Court soon reversed it-
self in Nebbia v. New York. 21 Rarely had the Court completely de-
parted from its prior reasoning or vocalized its retreat so openly.
Subsequently, the Court has not invalidated any economic regulation
on substantive due process grounds since 1937.
Where, then, is one to turn to substantiate one's economic rights?
The Court's decisions have all but nullified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's applicability to protection of economic rights. 22 However, the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment had become entwined with
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause early in its history.23
Therefore, those seeking justification of their economic rights could
only rely on the Takings Clause in a limited context.24 One scholar
has suggested that the most Lochner-esque provisions can be found in
Takings Clause analyses. 2 5 However, during the fifty years following
the Lochner reversal, the Court also limited the Takings Clause for
many of the same reasons it abandoned Lochnerism. 26 Today, the gap
caused by this early jurisprudence remains.
Fortunately, recent case law has reflected the Court's reconsidera-
tion of its hastiness in the area of economic rights during the preced-
ing century. In 1999, the Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause for the first time in 130
years in Saenz v. Roe.27 The Court held that a California statute au-
[the] right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties: to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling: to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into
all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a suc-
cessful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
21. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937): McClos-
key. supra note I (opining that many believe West Coast Hotel to be the most influential case in
overturning economic due process).
22. See W. Coast Hotel. 300 U.S. 379 (upholding minimum wage laws for women and noting
that the Constitution does not mention the freedom of contract): Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S.
502 (1934) (upholding minimum price fixes on sales of milk and opining that a state may imple-
ment any economic policy it deems in the interest of public welfare).
23. Chicago v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See also Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska. 164 U.S. 403
(1896).
24. The Takings Clause's effectiveness was limited in early jurisprudence because of the Mar-
shall Court's decision in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). which held that the Bill of
Rights restricted only the national government rather than the states' powers.
25. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy. 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
26. Id. at 890.
27. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). affg Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998), affg 966 F.
Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
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thorizing a durational residency requirement for new welfare recipi-
ents violated their right to the same privileges or immunities held by
long-term California residents. 28
In addition, lower courts appear eager to participate in the recon-
struction of this area of law.29 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee recently struck a state act on
grounds that it violated substantive due process in depriving individu-
als of their liberty interest in the right to pursue their chosen occupa-
tion.30 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed on December 6, 2002.31
Large corporations also seemed to be benefiting from this revived
interest in economic rights through increasingly liberal applications of
the Takings Clause. Phillip Morris was recently granted summary
judgment in its regulatory takings suit challenging the constitutionality
of a Massachusetts statute after the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction
and remanded. 32 This application has very recently been questioned,
however, and the First Circuit subsequently reversed the district
court's grant of permanent declaratory and injunctive relief, but then
withdrew that opinion and granted the plaintiff's petition for rehear-
ing en banc. 33 The First Circuit issued its decision affirming the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment and injunctive relief on
December 2, 2002. 34 An in-depth understanding of the historical de-
velopment as well as the recent jurisprudence surrounding the three
clauses is necessary to provide a full understanding of the law's meta-
morphosis in the area of economic liberties.
A. The Early Demise of Privileges or Immunities
Enacted in 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant
part, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .. . . "3 Much
28. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489.
29. See Nelson v. Geringer. 295 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that membership in the
Wyoming National Guard is a privilege under the Privileges or Immunities Clause and therefore
ordering the reinstatement of officers dismissed for not meeting residency requirements):
Craigmiles v. Giles. 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that a state regulation requir-
ing casket sellers to have a funeral directors license violated substantive due process).
30. Craigniles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658.
31. Craigmiles v. Giles. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24637 (6th Cir. 2002).
32. Phillip Morris Inc. v. Reilly. 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998), affg 957 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mass.
1997). remanded. 113 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2000).
33. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
34. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 (Ist Cir. 2002).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1.
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to the dismay and confusion of jurists, this is the extent of any practi-
cal instruction given by the Framers. 36 "Privileges or immunities"
were left undefined and no instructions were given to render the
phrase meaningful. 37 Scholars have even suggested that the language
of the clause was insignificant to the Framers themselves. 38 This lack
of clarity caused unrest among the Senate. At the time the Senate
took a final vote on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, one sena-
tor moved to discard the Privileges or Immunities Clause because of
its unclear nature. 39 His motion was rejected and the clause remained
in the passed amendment. However, an analysis of the subsequent
jurisprudence gives the impression that the clause was removed from
the amendment.
1. The Slaughter-House Cases
Due to Congress's failure to clarify the ambiguity surrounding the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court was left with the
substantial burden of analyzing the clause with little legislative gui-
dance. The result was what many consider to be a premature decision
by the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases.40 These cases involved
challenges to the exclusive rights to slaughter livestock the Louisiana
legislature gave to corporations. 41 Butchers left out of these corpora-
tions argued that this was a monopoly and an unconstitutional depri-
vation of their privilege to pursue a livelihood. 42
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the challengers' argument and
held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to exercise
increased control over states by the national government. 43 There-
fore, the Court reasoned that it was constitutionally permissible for
Louisiana to give slaughter houses a twenty-five year monopoly, effec-
36. See generally ROBERT H. BORK. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUC-
TION OF THE LAW 166 (The Free Press 1990): MICHAEL KENT CURTIs. No STATE SHALL
ABRIIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 13 (Duke Univ. Press
1986) (theorizing that the meanings of both the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due
Process Clause were not of utmost importance to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment).
37. See BORK, supra note 36. at 39 (generally discussing the lack of substantive meaning given
to the clause).
38. Id. (quoting 6 Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion: 1864-88. in HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1. at 1270 (1971)) (stating that the indefiniteness
of the clause's meaning was appealing to the clause's proposer. Representative Bingham of
Ohio). See also Harrison. supra note 2, at 1394.
39. See Harrison. supra note 2. at 1387.
40. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Field. J.. dissenting).
41. Id. at 38.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 48.
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tively putting the plaintiffs' competing facilities out of business.44
Thus, the Court virtually eradicated the clause by determining that it
was not a tool to protect state citizens from their own state's actions.
While many scholars criticize the Slaughter-House Cases as excessively
limiting, one argues that the Court properly narrowed a dangerous
amendment that would have otherwise allowed the Court to use its
own values as guidelines in construing public policy.45
Regardless of one's views on the propriety of the decision, it was
undoubtedly a large blow to citizens' protection of their economic
rights. Not surprisingly, the Slaughter-House Cases met with strong
dissent. Justice Stephen J. Field, joined by Justices Salmon P. Chase,
Noah H. Swayne, and Joseph P. Bradley, countered that the Four-
teenth Amendment does protect citizens of the United States against
deprivation of common rights by a state.46 The dissent argued that the
amendment would be a "vain and idle enactment" if it included only
protection of those rights adopted before its enactment. 47 The major-
ity's interpretation of privileges or immunities as a reference to rights
protected elsewhere in the Constitution caused the dissent's fears to
be realized. 48
The Court read the clause to not include the rights that belong to all
citizens of free government to pursue lawful employment, as Justice
Field urged.49 Justice Bradley also wrote separately in dissent and
opined that a monopoly such as the one Louisiana had created de-
prived its citizens of their lawful employment privileges and property
libertiesi.1
Many modern scholars agree with the dissenters and mourn the
death of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the one Framers in-
tended to have the most legal force when they enacted the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5' The fact that no legislative history demonstrates that
privileges or immunities were intended to be meaningless supports
this argument.52 Little or no legislative history exists on the clause.
The legislative record that does exist supports the proposition that the
44. Id.
45. See BORK. supra note 36. at 37-38 (generally opining that an activist judge cannot stop
himself from implementing his own values when construing a statute or the Constitution).
46. Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. at 64.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. JOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT: A THFORY OF JtJDICIAi REVIEW 22
(Harvard Univ. Press 1980).
52. Id.
2002]
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clause was intended to be afforded weight. 53 In presenting the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Senate, Senator Jacob M. Howard stated,
"privileges and immunities ... cannot be fully defined in their entire
extent and precise nature."' 54 Rather, he believed personal rights pro-
tected by the Constitution should be included in the privileges and
immunities granted to citizens.55
Furthermore, some scholars find it dispositive that Article IV of the
original Constitution barred states from acting against citizens' funda-
mental rights. 56 However, in light of the sparse explicit legislative his-
tory, the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases attempted to determine
its original intent.57 Some scholars also support the theory that the
political events during the period of enactment meant more to the
Framers than the actual language of the clause. 58 Therefore, the
words must be considered in historical context in order to ascertain
their meaning. In applying this theory, it is noteworthy that an issue
of utmost importance to the Fourteenth Amendment Framers was po-
litical power.59 The main concern at the time of enactment was under
what conditions the rebellious southern states would return to the
Union.60 This context would indeed suggest that the Bill of Rights, as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment, was applicable to the states.
Whether the states were bound by the Bill of Rights was not at issue in
the thirty-ninth Congress, although whether the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause applies to the states has since become controversial. 61
Nonetheless, the Slaughter-House Cases ultimately prevailed, and
the effect has been lasting. A superficial but important result of this
has been that the Court has only relied upon the Privileges or Immu-
53. Id. at 23. Furthermore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, Section two of
the Constitution lends meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Many scholars, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment Framers, have relied on the Corfield v.
Corvell analysis of what the Article IV counterpart encompasses as privileges and immunities.
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id.
56. See CURTIS, supra note 36, at 8; see also CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (Bing-
ham, 1866); 1263 (Broomall, 1866); 1833, 1835-36 (Laurence, 1866); 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202
(Wilson, 1864).
57. CHARLES MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 50 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1969) (discussing the problem the Court faces in applying original intent because of the age
and respect given the Constitution).
58. CURTIS, supra note 36. at 12 (discussing that the language of the clause has little plain
meaning when stripped of its historical context).
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id.
61. See BORK, supra note 36, at 90-91.
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nities Clause in two opinions in the 130 years since its nullification. 62
In Colgate v. Harvey, the Court held that the rights of United States
citizens to engage in business, transact any lawful business, or make a
lawful loan of money in any state other than that in which the citizen
lives are privileges under the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 The Court
further ruled that the right of a citizen of one state to contract in an-
other state may be a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause and
a privilege protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 64 There-
fore, a citizen may invoke either clause.65 However, this grant was
short-lived and the restoration of privileges or immunities was eradi-
cated five years later,66 contemporaneous to the Court's retreat from
economic due process rationales.67 The Court reburied the clause for
fifty-nine years.68
Upon obstructing any practical value intended to apply to the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, the Court found itself in a quandary. No
substantial tool existed with which the Court could protect economic
rights. In response, a large number of citizens whose suits failed in
state courts after Slaughter-House sought review under a substantive
due process rationale. 69 The possibility that the Constitution could
extend beyond its explicit terms was inviting enough that Justice Sa-
muel Miller, in the majority in Slaughter-House, used a substantive
due process approach to protect economic rights one year after that
decision.70
B. Affording the Due Process Clause Substantive Weight:
Economic Due Process
With the Court's eradication of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
from jurisprudence came the need for a viable alternative. The prob-
62. See Colgate v. Harvey. 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky. 309 U.S. 83
(1940): see also Saenz v. Roe, 525 U.S. 489 (1999) (-unearthing" the Privileges or Immunities
Clause for the first time in 130 years).
63. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 433.
66. See Madden v. Kentucky. 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (holding that the right to pursue a trade.
business, or calling is not a national privilege and, therefore, is not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
67. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage
laws for women in a seminal case eliminating substantive due process rationale for economic
rights): Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (reversing the Court's Lochner era decisions by
using mere rational basis in upholding New York's regulation of milk prices).
68. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69. See BORK. supra note 36, at 40.
70. Id.
2002]
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lem was that no established theory existed for the protection of eco-
nomic liberties. As a result, the Court developed a new legal theory.
1. The Rise of Substantive Due Process
"Judicial lawmaking has accelerated spectacularly in this century. 71
One scholar asserts that judicial power to strike economic regulation
with little legal justification results from this practice. 72
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."' 73 Although traditionally viewed as a procedural re-
quirement, 74 the Court expressed substantive interest in the provision
shortly after eliminating the effect of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.75 One scholar has attributed the elimination of that clause's
effectiveness to this trend, as well as to the economic circumstances in
the country at the time. 76 It is likely that the economy resulting from
post-Civil War industrialization led to more legislative regulation. 77
In response, the Court upheld a number of state regulations, but fore-
shadowed its imminent review of economic legislation within those
opinions.78
The Court adhered to its warning when it finally relied explicitly on
substantive due process in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.79 In striking a state
regulation that allowed people to obtain insurance for Louisiana prop-
erty only from Louisiana insurance companies, the Court relied on the
freedom of contract. s0 The liberty given persons by the Fourteenth
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. But see EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (La. St. Univ. Press 1948)
(arguing that due process reaches beyond its procedural aspects).
75. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (rejecting attack on state regulation of grain eleva-
tor rates because public welfare justified it, but warning that the judiciary would determine rea-
sonableness in private contracts where public interest is not at issue). Cf. R.R. Comm'n Cases,
116 U.S. 307 (1886) (sustaining state regulation of railroad rates but warning that states' regula-
tory powers are not limitless). See also Mugler v. Kansas. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (sustaining state
alcohol ban but indicating that legislation is valid only if actually related to public health inter-
ests): Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (holding that state's rate regulations of railroad were
so low as to deprive the railroad of its property without due process of the law).
76. See MICHAEL PERRY. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 161 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1994) (stating that the Court has traditionally invoked the Due Process Clause
to support decisions that have more foundation in the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
77. GUNTHER ET AL., supra note 15. at 458.
78. Id.
79. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
80. Id.
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Amendment, the Court reasoned, protected the right to work where
one desires and to enter contracts to accomplish that goal.81
a. Lochnerism
The Court upheld Allgeyer in its landmark decision, Lochner v. New
York. 82 The Lochner Court struck a New York statute prohibiting
employment of bakers for more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a
week. 83 The Court relied on the newfound "liberty to contract" be-
tween employers and employees in reasoning that the statute was un-
constitutional because it interfered with this right. 84 While the state
ends of public health were deemed important, the means by which
they were accomplished were judged to only remotely relate to public
health. 85 Furthermore, the Court voiced its concern with the breadth
of the regulation, stating that if this statute were found valid, any right
of employment could be regulated with the effect that doctors, scien-
tists, athletes, and artists "could be forbidden to fatigue their brains
and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise .... -86 Four Justices dis-
sented in Lochner, but even three of those accepted that a liberty to
contract could be found in the Fourteenth Amendment.8 7 In his fa-
mous dissent, even Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes accepted substan-
tive due process. He merely disagreed as to which rights were
fundamental.88
In contrast to the Court's concerns that states would pass an abun-
dance of economic legislation, states soon found it difficult to uphold
any economic regulation against the force of what had become eco-
nomic due process. For the next three decades, the Court struck down
numerous state economic regulations, virtually on a per se basis. 89 Ju-
risprudence would never be the same.
81. Id. at 592.
82. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
83. Id. at 49.
84. Id.
85. Speculation has arisen that New York's real purpose in enacting the statute was to protect
workers' welfare and that the Court did not approve of such labor law because of its potential
for interference with a free market economy.
86. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60.
87. See CURTIS, supra note 36, at 45.
88. Lochner. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes. J., dissenting).
89. See Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (invalidating state prohibition on the
use of shoddy mattress materials because the protection of health does not justify this large of a
remedy): Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (deciding that a state law requiring employees
not to join unions as a condition of employment violated substantive due process rights): see also
Adair v. United States. 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (holding that a federal law barring "yellow-dog
contracts" was unconstitutional because a person has a right to sell his labor on his own terms ).
2002]
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The impact of Lochner and its protection of economic rights were
monumentally broad. Indeed, the decision has been called the "quin-
tessence of judicial usurpation of power." 90 After the decision, the
Court invalidated approximately two hundred state laws. 91 Affording
substantive content to due process created a breadth of values not
found in the text of the Constitution.92 This practice did not pass
without opposition, and soon the Court and the legislature reached a
peak in their battle over the Court's only remaining Fourteenth
Amendment tool to invalidate state economic regulation.
2. The Decline of Economic Due Process
By the 1930s, changes in the economy and the legislative and execu-
tive branches necessitated increased regulation.93 The Great Depres-
sion was at its height and with the shift in political power, voters
elected an administration that sought to alter the Court's practices in
order to achieve its goals. 94 Previously, most economic regulations oc-
curred at the state level, where substantive due process rationales
were the only means to restrict them.95 Due to the shift in the econ-
omy, Congress was now passing many national economic regulations
that the Court could strike by finding that such legislation was not
within Congress's power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion.96 The Court's use of this additional tool was a severe roadblock
to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal. '97 The infamous
"court-packing" plan followed. Roosevelt's plan was to appoint an
additional judge for each federal judge that did not resign upon turn-
ing seventy years old. He disguised this as a way of helping the Court
with its docket. 98 Later, Roosevelt urged the plan in a more straight-
forward manner, stating that a change was necessary to "save the
Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself." 99 The result-
90. See CURTIS, supra note 36, at 44.
91. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92. See BORK, supra note 36. at 16-26 (generally discussing the implementation of judicial
values into the Constitution).
93. Id. at 49.
94. Id. (discussing the shift in political power and its large impact on the Court's decisions).
95. Id. at 51.
96. U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8.
97. See BORK, supra note 36, at 52 (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935)) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1932 passed as part of the New
Deal and giving the President power to regulate various industries).
98. Id. at 54 (discussing how President Roosevelt's real motives were apparent since six Jus-
tices were over seventy years old, and the bill would allow Roosevelt to appoint six additional
justices to support his plan).
99. Id. at 54. But see ELY, supra note 51, at 46 (discussing that the Court's resulting "switch"
was not due to Roosevelt's announcement of his plan).
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ing "switch in time that saved nine" 1°° reached Roosevelt's desired
objectives.
The Court's subsequent retreat from its Lochner era treatment of
economic regulations culminated in Nebbia v. New York.' 0 In up-
holding New York's fix on milk prices, the Court reasoned that the
regulations did not violate individuals' rights to due process because
price fixes were in the public's interest. 10 2 This was directly contrary
to the Court's reasoning in Lochner, strictly scrutinizing whether re-
stricting bakers' hours had a substantial relationship to New York's
interest in public health. 10 3 Rational basis review was used in the def-
erential Nebbia opinion as opposed to the apparent strict scrutiny
used during the three previous decades.10 4
Regardless of the rationale, which will be discussed momentarily,
the effect was that the Court upheld numerous state regulations al-
most summarily. The popularized idea that economic due process ju-
risprudence should be reversed became so prevalent that the Court
abandoned stare decisis. 10 5 The Court confirmed its retreat from the
due process protection of economic liberties through numerous
decisions. 106
100. See BORK, supra note 36. at 55 (discussing that it may have been a combination of
Roosevelt's plan as well as the death and retirement of justices that lead to the Court's
"switch").
101. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
102. Id. (reasoning that the New York statute transferred money from consumers to milk
producers, and this was in the interest of public welfare).
103. Cf. Lochner, 198 U.S. 45.
104. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (holding a requirement that ice
manufacturers act as public utilities to be invalid): Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1923) (striking a law that mandated a minimum wage to be paid to women); Lochner, 198 U.S.
45 (purporting to apply a reasonableness standard of review but actually treating liberty of con-
tract as a fundamental right deserving of strict scrutiny): see also GUNTHER ET AL., supra note 15.
at 469-70 (discussing that one of the Lochner "evils" may be that the Court actually applied strict
scrutiny to what it deemed fundamental rights, despite purporting to apply lesser standards of
review at the beginning of the period).
105. See BORK. supra note 36, at 155 (arguing that although the Court was correct in stopping
its deformation of the Constitution, it was incorrect to attempt to alter all its previous mistakes).
106. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (ruling that a Kansas prohibition of the
practice of debt adjusters except by lawyers is constitutional): Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.. 348
U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding constitutionality of state regulation limiting opticians' production of
old lenses into new frames because the law does not have to be consistent with its goals in every
way); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. N.W. Iron & Metal Co.. 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (supporting
return to pre-Lochner rationale that states may legislate what they "deem to be injurious prac-
tices of their internal affairs"): Olsen v. Nebraska. 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (deciding that states may
fix maximum employment agency fees and reasoning that public policy should not be read into
the Constitution): United States v. Carolene Prods.. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (validating the constitu-
tionality of a federal prohibition of filled milk shipments under the belief that the statute
worked, although no record existed): W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (up-
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3. Abandonment of Economic Due Process and Discrediting of the
Lochner Era "Evils"
The Court has never returned to its protection of economic liberties
on substantive due process grounds. 107 The rejection of economic due
process reasoning and the many scholarly characterizations of it as
"evil" raise a host of questions.108 Many theories in law reviews and
treatises have attempted to answer these difficult questions. 10 9 First,
the rationale underlying the Court's disdain for economic due process
must be explored. Furthermore, whether the Framers intended to
read substance into the Due Process Clause must be determined. Fi-
nally, the Court's complete reversal raises the question whether it is
wiser to leave the hole left by the Court's abandonment unfilled.
As discussed earlier, °10 the basis of economic due process necessa-
rily rested on judicial value judgments. In fact, one scholar has sug-
gested that understanding the actual Constitution may be difficult
because of the nation's developmental reliance on the Court's ac-
tions.111 It may be the practice of judicial review itself, rather than the
values read into the Constitution, that some view unfavorably.' 12
However, the Court regularly reads values into the Constitution in all
areas of its review. It may be the difficult area of economics or a
belief that the Court read inappropriate values into the Constitution
that led to the belief of Lochner evility. 113 The problem that results
when the Court invalidates a legislative act as unconstitutional is that
it effectively overrules a legislative judgment in a way that cannot be
altered.1 14 The resulting evil is that the Court, which is neither elected
nor politically responsible, maintains the power of governing those
who are elected with its own values.' 1 5 However, the Court's duty is
to uphold the Constitution. 16 This duty necessitates construing vague
provisions such as the Due Process Clause.'1 7 The change of the
holding state minimum wage law for women because protecting women's health is in the public
interest).
107. See BORK. supra note 36.
108. See PERRY, supra note 76, at 164 (discussing Lochner's reputation as "one of the great
examples of negative constitutional decision-making").
109. See, e.g., BORK. supra note 36: McCloskey, supra note 1: PERRY. supra note 76.
110. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
11. See PERRY, supra note 76. at 165.
112. ELY, supra note 51, at 15 (noting that substantive due process is still used in areas outside
of economic regulation).
113. See GUNTHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 468-70.
114. See ELY, supra note 51. at 4.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id.
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Court's values with a shift in its members may not have been reason
enough to disregard the entire area of economic rights as evil and
inappropriate.
Furthermore, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have
intended to read substance into the Due Process Clause.' 18 The Fram-
ers were aware of at least one pre-Civil War decision precluding a
certain substantive result.' 19 This indicates that the Lochner era deci-
sions may not have been wholly incorrect in giving the Due Process
Clause a substantive interpretation. Rather, it may have been the
broad scope of substance that the Court has since sought to elimi-
nate. 120 However, restricting and modifying due process does not re-
move its substantive aspect altogether. 2 1
Another question raised by the Court's complete reversal is
whether it is wiser to leave the gaping wound left by the Court's aban-
donment of economic due process than it is to apply inadequate band-
ages. Although this will be explored in-depth in Part 111,122 it is
important to note popular legal opinion closer to the time of the
Court's actions. The field of economic due process is unique because
it is difficult to recall another area where the Court acted so swiftly
and completely to eliminate a constitutional doctrine once thought to
hold much importance.' 2 3 In the beginning of the Court's retreat, it
did not appear that the Court would thoroughly shift extremes.
Rather, the Court chose to use rational basis review of economic regu-
lation but apply it so deferentially that it had virtually no "bite."' 2 4
However, in subsequent decisions, the Court rejected substantive due
process outright in the economic realm. 125 Perhaps the closest the
Court came to explaining this rejection is found in American Federa-
tion of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.1 2 6 The concurring opinion
stated that the judiciary's propensity is to "misconceive the public
118. Id. at 15.
119. See id. at 15-16 (citing Wvnehamer v. People. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). invalidating a prohibi-
tion law under state due process guarantee).
120. The broad substance the Court has read into the Due Process Clause has varied from the
liberty of contract in Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). to the right to receive informa-
tion about birth control in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
121. See ELY. supra note 51. at 20.
122. See infra notes 465-489 and accompanying text.
123. McCloskev. supra note 1.
124. Id. at 42 (opining that the Court first avoided discarding substantive due process com-
pletely because it would have forced the Justices to explain their reasoning. something they were
not prepared to do).
125. See W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379 (directly overruling the Lochner-era decision of Adkins.
261 U.S. 525. by upholding a minimum wage law for women).
126. 335 U.S. 538, 544 (1949).
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good," and therefore, policy-making lies properly with the people and
their representatives.127 However, the Court continues to give large
substantive weight to the Due Process Clause in its analysis of per-
sonal liberties. 128 Therefore, the evils of value implementation per-
taining to economic liberties are contradictory and confusing. The
Court clearly has not left public policy to the legislature in other areas,
and it therefore appears that the Lochner evils can be understood only
in the extreme context in which they were made.
C. The Takings Clause as an Incomplete Alternative
With the demise of both the Privileges or Immunities and Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was forced to
once again look elsewhere in order to protect economic liberties. One
such area was the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
"There is no distinct line separating liberty and property."'1 29 As
early as 1792, James Madison equated property with economic liber-
ties. 130 It may be this strong correlation that has tempted the Court to
rely on regulatory takings rationales to justify protection of economic
rights.13 1 However, in the last half century, the Court has not used the
provision in a remedial capacity to protect economic interests.1 32 A
regulatory taking involves virtually the same factual scenario as an
economic due process scenario. Both involve a government action
that purportedly regulates or prohibits one's economic liberty so thor-
oughly as to effectually deprive one of it.t33 In a takings context, the
regulation must amount to a taking of one's property rather than
merely a deprivation.t 34 This sounds straightforward enough. Upon
further analysis, however, it becomes apparent that the takings juris-
127. Id. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
128. See McCloskey. supra note 1. at 45 (discussing the doubtful distinction between economic
and personal rights, and that although judicial preferences have changed, people may still find
the former as important as the latter).
129. ROGER CLEGG ET AL.. REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
2 (Nat'l Legal Center for the Public Interest 1994).
130. Id. (quoting JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 201 (Hobson et al. eds.,
1979)) (referring to property as: "In its larger and juster meaning. it embraces every thing [sic]
to which a man may attach a value and have a right: .... He has property very dear to him in the
safety and liberty of his person. He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free
choice of the objects on which to employ them.") (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. See CLEGG ET AL.. supra note 129. at 2 (discussing the Court's "insensitivity" to eco-
nomic rights).
133. Id.
134. Id. (stating that "taken" implies less protection than "deprivation," because the former
means that one loses the right while another gains it, while a deprivation may be effected al-
though the right was never had and so protects a broader category of rights).
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prudence has become nearly as large a challenge for the legal system
as the Fourteenth Amendment clauses.' 35 In large part, this effect is
due to the very elimination of those latter clauses. Because other ave-
nues for protecting economic rights have been eliminated, the Takings
Clause has become virtually the only area where citizens may alleviate
governmental interference. 136
However, a judiciary faced with a Fifth Amendment takings analy-
sis has only the provision's generalized text and contradictory prece-
dent to guide it. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, "[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."' 137 Early in the history of the clause, the Supreme Court ex-
pressed in dicta that it favored such protection against "takings."' 138
As with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, this enthusiasm was
short-lived. In Barron v. Baltimore,139 the Marshall Court weakened
the Takings Clause as applied to the states, but not as applied to the
federal government. 40 The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amend-
ment did not restrain the city from altering the flow of streams despite
the consequence of ruining the petitioner's ability to use his wharf. 141
In the Court's view, this did not constitute a taking for public use
without just compensation. Fortunately, this decision did not weaken
the Takings Clause as substantially as the Slaughter-House Cases
weakened the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Rather, judicial recognition of regulatory takings is historically es-
tablished. In United States v. Lynah, 42 the Court held that the gov-
ernment's construction of dams that flooded lands and destroyed its
value was a taking despite the lack of appropriating title. Subsequent
cases extended the Lynah holding and firmly established the regula-
tory taking rationale. 43 However, the scope of this right was not
resolved.
The actual language of the clause provides little clarification. For
instance, it is difficult to determine what "taken for public use" refers
135. Id. at 3.
136. Id.
137. U.S. CONs T. amend. V.
138. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
139. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
140. Id. However, after the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, the Court held that the
Takings Clause was incorporated and applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
141. Id. at 251.
142. 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903).
143. See United States v. Cress. 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (expanding Lynah to invalidate govern-
mental installation of a lock and dam system which caused flooding and prevented the plausibil-
ity of a mill operation).
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to, because the public cannot use something that does not exist. 144
Therefore, if what the government has taken through regulation is a
right to use property, then a property right must have existed. 145 The
property right is then analogous to economic rights that the Court
subsequently determined did not exist within the Constitution. 46
However, the Takings Clause cannot be viewed as a replacement for
other protections of economic rights because not all economic regula-
tions may fit into a takings construct.1 47
Furthermore, evidence exists that the Court's retreat from close
scrutiny of economic regulations extended beyond the boundaries of
substantive due process. During the Court's reversal of the Lochner
period, takings challenges to regulatory schemes also failed. 148 The
undue weight placed on the Takings Clause because of the elimination
of the aforementioned economic protections is analyzed further in
Part 111. However, it is useful to briefly describe the components of a
regulatory takings analysis.
The Supreme Court has used an ad hoc approach to determine
whether a government regulation amounts to a taking.1 49 The main
factors of this analysis are: (1) the economic effect of the regulation;
(2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations;" and (3) the character of the govern-
ment action. 150 The first factor refers to the economic impact on the
claimant. If the plaintiff has suffered no value diminution, then she
has no claim but is entitled to compensation for a taking which has
even a slight negative impact on her property's value. 151 The second
factor refers to the extent that the regulation has interfered with the
144. See CLEGG ET AL., supra note 129, at 11.
145. Id.
146. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (establishing the Court's retreat from any sub-
stantive protection to economic rights).
147. For example. it is unlikely that a state regulation ruling that all televisions be manufac-
tured with silver borders would be viewed as a taking even though companies' sales max, suffer
because consumers want black borders, because the regulation was not for public use. However,
under early economic due process, this would fall under the Allgeyer directive that citizens be
allowed to earn money through any lawful business. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
148. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a state statute
extending the period of redemption from foreclosure and the sale of real property in the same
year that Nebbia severely restricted protection under economic due process claims): Sunstein.
supra note 25. at 890.
149. See CLEGG ET AL.. supra note 129. at 7 (proposing refinements to the ad hoc inquiries to
effect a rule rather than a balancing test).
150. See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104. 124 (1978).
151. See CLEGc, L-r AL., supra note 129, at 19.
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plaintiff's "investment-backed expectation."' 152 This relates to the
question of what a taking encompasses in contrast to a deprivation.1 53
Finally, the character of the government action examines whether the
taking was for public use. 154
As with any ad hoc analysis, the danger that the clause may become
a "mask for judicial predilections" exists. 155 However, it is difficult to
narrow the broad text of the clause. The proposed text first stated,
"No person shall be ... obliged to relinquish his property, where it
may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation."'' 56 The
adopted text is broader, but the Framers provided no explanation for
why the clause was changed. 157 Proposed approaches for determining
when regulation is appropriate are equally subjective. For example,
the noxious use approach directs that if the court finds the nature of
the use "noxious, wrongful, harmful or prejudicial to the health, safety
or morals of the public," then the government regulation is justifia-
ble. 158 Therefore, value implementation becomes necessary in con-
struing the Takings Clause, as it is in the Privileges or Immunities and
Due Process Clauses.
D. A Trend Toward Revival of Economic Liberties
Despite the bleak treatment of economic rights in the past, recent
jurisprudence suggests a revived interest in the area on all federal ju-
dicial levels. Current opinions have relied on the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause, substantive due process, and regulatory takings
rationales.
1. Reconsideration of Privileges or Immunities: Saenz v. Roe
At the district court level, Roe v. Anderson involved a plaintiff seek-
ing preliminary injunctive relief against imposition of a California stat-
ute. 159 Brenda Roe was a resident of Oklahoma until 1997, when her
husband lost his job and the couple relocated to California in search
of employment. Roe was six months pregnant at the time and could
152. Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash and Door Co. 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
153. See generally Ct.EGG E AL.. supra note 129.
154. Id. at 32. See also Mugler v. Kansas. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding state prohibition law
in first regulatory takings case): Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding regulation of
grain storage prices because property subjected to public use is subject to price regulation).
155. See ELY, supra note 51. at 8.
156. Id.
157. See CLEGG ET AL., supra note 129, at 15.
158. Lawrence Berger. A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem. 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165. 172
(1974).
159. Roe v. Anderson. 966 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
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not be left unattended; therefore, her husband could not work. 160 The
California statute imposed a one-year durational residency require-
ment on welfare recipients.' 6' As a practical matter, this meant Cali-
fornia would only give Roe the benefit amount she was entitled to in
Oklahoma rather than California, which was $307 as opposed to
$565.162 In parallel litigation, the Court of Appeals vacated the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) waiver. Therefore,
the statute ceased to apply absent Secretary approval.1
63
While Roe v. Anderson was pending, Congress enacted the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA).164 This act gave the states discretion to design federally
supported welfare programs. In effect, PRWORA authorized states
to use durational residency requirements such as the one in Califor-
nia.165 Thus, the requirement was reinstated, and the plaintiff brought
the present action to challenge its constitutionality under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, asserting that it violated her constitutional right to
travel. 166 The district court granted Roe's preliminary injunction, not-
ing that the plaintiff had shown the possibility of irreparable injury
since she could not afford housing and other basic necessities under
the lower, Oklahoma-based amount. 167 Privileges or immunities were
not mentioned in the opinion, as it would be presumptive for a lower
court to apply the buried clause in light of Supreme Court precedent
nullifying it.
The State of California appealed the preliminary injunction to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which af-
firmed. 168 The court held that the PRWORA and the California stat-
ute to which it granted authority violated equal protection provisions
and threatened the plaintiff with deprivation of basic necessities in
violation of Section 1983.169 The Supreme Court then granted certio-
rari to resolve the constitutionality of the PRWORA.170 The Saenz1
7 1
decision and its exhumation of privileges or immunities followed.
160. Id.
161. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (2001).
162. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. at 980.
163. Id. at 979.
164. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1996).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1996).
166. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. at 977.
167. Id. at 985.
168. Anderson v. Roe. 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998).
169. Id.
170. Anderson v. Roe. 524 U.S. 982 (1998).
171. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), affg 134 F. 3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998).
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The Court relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause for only
the second time since the Slaughter-House Cases. 72 In holding that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected citizens' rights to be
treated like other state citizens in the state to which they move, the
Court relied on the unenumerated right to travel. In justifying its use
of this dead doctrine, the Court actually relied on Slaughter-House
dicta explaining the privilege of citizens to become a citizen of any
state by bona fide residence within that state and to enjoy the same
rights as other citizens of that state.' 73 The Court reviewed
PRWORA's alleged infringement on Roe's liberty with strict scrutiny.
In doing so, the Court rejected the state's argument that the statute be
upheld based on rational basis and its legitimate state interest in sav-
ing ten million dollars per year.' 74
The Saenz decision also referenced pre-Slaughter-House decisions
relying on privileges or immunities. 75 In addition, the Court recog-
nized the important role that privileges or immunities have in afford-
ing visiting citizens equality of privileges within states they enter.' 76
The Court then went a step further in exhuming the clause by refer-
encing Justice Field's dissenting opinion in Slaughter-House for the
premise that a citizen choosing to become a citizen of a different state
is not "bound to cringe to a superior as a means of enjoying the rights
and privileges given other citizens."' 177 The Court concluded that
PRWORA could not justify the constitutionality of the California stat-
ute because Congress may not grant states the power to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and thereby citizens' privileges or
immunities. 178
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas, noted in his dissent that the Court effectually "breathed new
life into the previously dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment" with the Saenz ruling. 79 Chief Justice
Rehnquist established that he did not favor disregarding privileges or
immunities entirely, but rather that this decision did not require the
Court's reliance on the clause. In his view, the majority held that a
state cannot classify citizens by length of residence without offending
172. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
173. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 495.
174. Id.
175. See Corfield v. Corvell. 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
176. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 499.
177. Id. at 513. (citing Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Field, J..
dissenting)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 511 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting).
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their privileges or immunities. 18°1 Therefore, the majority was assert-
ing its interest in protecting the respondent's right to enjoy all the
privileges of California citizens by classifying it as the right to travel.
Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the durational residency require-
ment challenged was a rational exercise of the state's power to ensure
that residents enjoy services meant for them only. 181
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent, opining that the majority
gave a meaning to privileges or immunities that the enactors of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend. 18 2 In doing so, he was careful
to distinguish the Privileges or Immunities Clause from the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
noted that these latter clauses had reached a "near talismanic status"
in jurisprudence because the Privileges or Immunities Clause was nul-
lified.' 83 Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion reiterated the view that
privileges or immunities are limited to United States citizens and do
not extend protection to state citizens against legislation of their own
state.' 8 4 Furthermore, the dissent instructed the majority to examine
history to construe the phrases' meanings and concluded that this in-
terpretation limited the clause to protection of only the fundamental
rights that United States citizens hold.' 85 However, in a large leap
toward the restoration of privileges or immunities, the dissent stated
that it was also open to "reevaluate its meaning in an appropriate
case."186 Justice Thomas opined that the virtual eradication of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause partially caused the current disarray
of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.187
It did not take long for lower courts to follow the Court's explicit
interest in reviving economic liberties. However, in the face of only
one positive decision regarding privileges or immunities in 130 years,
the step taken was a smaller, but influential, reinstitution of economic
substantive due process.
Justice Thomas's statement in Saenz regarding the disarray of the
Fourteenth Amendment in modern constitutional jurisprudence is
180. Id.
181. Id. at 520.
182. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 522.
185. Id. at 527.
186. Id. at 528.
187. Id. at 527-28.
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well-documented. 18 8 Furthermore, the belief that the eradication of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause played a large role in subsequent
confusion is supported by case law and scholarly analysis.1 89 Al-
though economic due process after Lochner lay idle for decades, it has
never been as completely eliminated as was privileges or immunities.
There has been a slow trend toward reviving the application of sub-
stantive due process to protect economic rights.
2. Moderate Lochnerism: Craigmiles v. Giles
The plaintiffs in Craigmiles v. Giles sought to sell caskets in retail in
Tennessee. 19° However, the plaintiffs were ordered to refrain from
selling because of the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers
Act (FDEA).' 9' The FDEA directs that only individuals holding a
funeral directors license may sell funeral merchandise in the state. 92
The complainants did not have such a license; however, one plaintiff
had invested approximately thirty thousand dollars in his business and
operated it for four months before the defendant, the Executive Di-
rector of the Tennessee Funeral Board and Burial Services, ordered
him to stop all sales. 193
The requirements for earning a funeral directors license are de-
manding. Two options exist, both requiring a substantial investment
of time and money. Persons may complete a study course at an ap-
proved school for funeral directors and undergo a year-long appren-
ticeship, or participate in a two-year apprenticeship.1 94 The only
approved school is located in Nashville and the course lasts for twelve
to sixteen months at a cost of ten to twelve thousand dollars. 95 Fur-
thermore, participants in the programs are required to take an exami-
nation in which only a small number of questions refer to casket
construction.1 96 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs were considered to be en-
188. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 528. See also BORK. supra note 36. at 37 (discussing how the Due
Process Clause's applicability to the states leads to increased opportunity for implementing judi-
cial values into the Constitution).
189. Id. (recognizing that Justice Miller. joining the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases.
could not resist inferring value into the Constitution one year later in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka. 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874)): ELY. supra note 51. at 18 (stating that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause possibly holds substantive weight that the Due Process clause lacks, but noting the resur-
rection of substantive due process).
190. 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
191. Id. at 659.
192. Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-101 - 62-5-
611 (2001).
193. Craigmiles. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 661.
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gaging in funeral directing under the FDEA by selling caskets and
therefore had to meet the FDEA's requirements. 197 The plaintiffs
claimed that the FDEA violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In re-
sponse, Tennessee advanced state interests of protecting funeral con-
sumers and protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the public. 198
The district court in Craigmiles invalidated the FDEA on substan-
tive due process grounds in holding that it deprived plaintiffs of their
"liberty interests in the right to pursue their chosen occupation.' 199
The court determined that the appropriate inquiry when faced with
economic regulation is a rational basis standard of review.200 While
finding that protecting funeral consumers and public health are legiti-
mate government interests, the court held that the licensure require-
ment was not rationally related to achieving these goals.20 1 The court
noted that a casket is merely "a container for human remains" and
that no evidence existed that "anyone has ever been harmed by a
leaky casket. ' 20 2 Furthermore, the court found that consumers would
be better served and their interests protected by having options for
purchasing caskets. 20 3 The court held that none of the asserted gov-
ernment interests was served by limiting the number of casket sellers
in the state. 20 4
The court's attempt to moderately apply substantive due process to
economic regulation was apparent. To accomplish this feat, the court
cited Lochner era cases, establishing a liberty interest in the right to
pursue an occupation 205 and subsequent cases limiting this right.206
The court even went so far as to cite Lochner for the proposition that
a legitimate government interest alone does not justify upholding a
law.207
In a brief explanation, the court also held that the FDEA violated
the Equal Protection Clause.20 The court noted, however, that it was
beyond its role to "breathe new life into the Privileges or Immunities
197. Id.
198. Id. at 662.
199. Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 661.
200. Id. at 662.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 664.
204. Id.
205. Craigniles. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 661 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
206. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933) (holding that the right to pursue a profession
may be conditioned).
207. Id. at 662 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
2(18. Craigniles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (relying on substantive due process reasoning in find-
ing that the state lacks a rational basis for hindering casket sales).
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Clause," although it expressed an interest in doing So.209 This prong
of the decision cited numerous examples reconsidering the role of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and took notice of the Saenz decision
grounded in that clause. 210 The court further opined that the Slaugh-
ter-House dissenters might have found that the plaintiffs in the present
case had been deprived of their privileges or immunities.21  There-
fore, while the court stressed the fact that the result it reached was
based on substantive due process, it acknowledged its willingness to
reevaluate the Privileges or Immunities Clause and its role in the
Fourteenth Amendment.21 2
In a strong but cautious step toward the protection of economic
rights, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling shortly
before publication of this Comment. 21 3 The court noted that the
FDEA could not pass even the minimal scrutiny used in challenges
against economic regulation. Thus, the FDEA was not rationally re-
lated to preserving public health but was rather geared toward elimi-
nating competition against funeral directors.214 The court was careful
to limit enjoinment of the FDEA only as it applies to funeral items
sold by retailers. 21 5 Furthermore, the court noted the rarity of striking
legislation on rational basis grounds, but held it to be proper in this
case because the licensure requirement bore no relationship to the
state's safety interests. 21 6 The state offered many justifications for the
FDEA on appeal, none of which the court found legitimate.
First, the court rejected the state's argument that the FDEA would
help contain the spread of diseases, because the licensure requirement
did not govern the quality of caskets used. 217 Rather, the court rea-
soned that the FDEA may negatively affect the quality of caskets
used, because the higher prices charged by funeral directors forces the
public to buy cheaper caskets. 218 Second, the state's argument that
funeral directors' education enables them to dispense advice about
which caskets are most protective fails because directors can offer this
209. Id.
210. Id. at 667.
211. Id. at 666.
212. Id. at 667.
213. Craigmiles. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24637 (6th Cir. 2002).
214. Id. at 10 (recognizing that funeral directors often raise the retail price of caskets 250 to
600 percent and that retailers such as the plaintiffs sell at lower prices).
215. Id. at 13.
216. Id. at 6 (stating that -[e]ven foolish and misdirected provisions are generally valid if
subject only to rational basis review").
217. Id. at 12.
218. Id. at 14-15.
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advice whether the licensure requirement exists or not.219 Third, the
court held that the licensure provision of the FDEA was not rationally
related to consumer protection because consumers may be protected
against fraud by retailers through civil and criminal sanctions or by
making the FDEA provisions protecting against fraud directly appli-
cable to retailers. 220 The licensure requirement is not necessary to
protect consumers. Fourth, the FDEA does not protect consumers by
making the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) rule applicable to re-
tailers.22' This rule requires itemized prices for both funeral merchan-
dise and services so that funeral homes do not make consumers buy
unnecessary services through packaged prices.2 22 The court held that
this purpose is irrelevant when applied to retailers rather than direc-
tors, because competition by retailers will actually reduce casket
prices and because retailers only sell goods, so the risk of "packaging"
goods and services does not exist.223 Fifth, the court rejected the
state's argument that the licensure requirement protects consumers
buying goods prior to death because the plaintiffs in the present case
did not engage in such "pre-need" sales. 224 Finally, the state's argu-
ment that the FDEA protects consumers psychologically because of
the grief training involved in licensure fails because consumers who
buy caskets from retailers will still use directors for funeral services,
and thus receive the benefit of grief training at that time.225
After finding that the FDEA licensure requirement bore no ra-
tional relationship to the state's asserted interests, the court recog-
nized that invalidating economic regulation on substantive due
process grounds is rare in modern jurisprudence. 226 Specifically, the
court stressed that its decision was "not a return to Lochner" and that
it was not forcing its "view of a well-functioning market on the people
of Tennessee. '227
219. Craigmiles. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24637 at 15.
220. Id. at 16-17.
221. Id. at 19.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 20-21.
224. Id. at 22 (noting that if plaintiffs subsequently sold caskets before death, the FDEA
would apply to them).
225. Craigmiles. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24637 at 22-23.
226. Id. at 24.
227. Id.
[Vol. 52:675
THE RETURN TO LOCHNERISM?
3. The Uncertainty of Regulatory Takings for the Protection of
Economic Giants: Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly
The initial focus of this section was on the revival of regulatory tak-
ings as an avenue for large corporations to protect their economic in-
terests. However, as of November 16, 2001, that constitutional
component of redress was once again called into question. In a flurry
of decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
granted a plaintiff corporation's preliminary injunction enjoining a
state regulation that likely effected a taking,228 then effectively re-
versed itself after remand 229 and has subsequently withdrawn the re-
versal after granting the plaintiff's motion for rehearing en banc. The
case was reargued on January 7, 2002. Shortly before publication, on
December 2, 2002, the First Circuit issued its new opinion granting
injunctive relief to the plaintiff manufacturers.
a. Phillip Morris 1230
The district court of Massachusetts in Phillip Morris Inc. v. Harsh-
barger ruled on a preliminary injunction sought by four cigarette man-
ufacturers to enjoin the enactment of a Massachussetts statute
requiring the companies to report tobacco ingredients. 231 The statute,
Massachusetts Tobacco Ingredients & Nicotine Yield Act (307B) re-
quired tobacco manufacturers to produce a detailed list of the ingredi-
ents of tobacco products sold in the state. 232 Furthermore, the statute
and its implementing regulations reserved the right to make the infor-
mation public.2 33
The plaintiff cigarette manufacturers moved for a preliminary in-
junction while they pursued the merits of their unconstitutionality
claim on Due Process, Takings, and Commerce Clause grounds. 234
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the reporting requirement
would reveal trade secrets to competitors, thereby destroying the
secrets' economic value, thus resulting in a regulatory taking without
just compensation. 235 In granting the plaintiffs' motion, the district
court recognized the states' broad regulatory power over business in
228. Phillip Morris. Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998) (hereinafter Phillip Mor-
ris II).
229. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
230. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger. 122 F.3d 58 (lst Cir. 1997) (hereinafter Phillip Morris
I).
231. Id.
232. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (1996).
233. Id.
234. Phillip Morris 1. 122 F.3d 58 (lst Cir. 1997).
235. Id.
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the public interest. The court reiterated that not all regulations de-
creasing the economic value of property rights entitled owners to
compensation. 236 However, the court held that the broad state police
power is not limitless. In addition, the economic impact and interfer-
ence with the plaintiffs' investment-backed expectation weighed in the
plaintiffs' favor for the likelihood of success on the merits. Therefore,
the injunction was granted.237 The First Circuit initially addressed the
case by affirming that the statute was not preempted by federal law in
Phillip Morris 1.238
b. Phillip Morris II
The First Circuit then affirmed the preliminary injunction in Phillip
Morris H.239 The court relied on the regulatory takings argument, de-
termining that it was unnecessary to reach the issue of a physical tak-
ing. 240  Therefore, the analysis depended on an ad hoc
determination. 241  Massachusetts conceded that the information re-
quirement would disclose valuable trade secrets, but argued that this
was justified due to the state's interest in police power over public
health. 242 The state further argued that the plaintiffs were compen-
sated by being allowed to continue business in Massachusetts in return
for a 307B disclosure. 243 The First Circuit rejected the soundness of
the latter argument noting that "permission to engage in routine activ-
ities" is not sufficient compensation under existing authority.244 The
court held that the plaintiffs had shown the requisite likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits for a preliminary injunction and noted that Massa-
chusetts's arguments would probably "bear no fruit," although it was
not a matter to be decided at that juncture.245
After the First Circuit's affirmation of the preliminary injunction,
the plaintiff manufacturers moved for summary judgment in district
court, requesting permanent declaratory and injunctive relief to pro-
hibit the ingredient disclosing provision of 307B. 246 The district court
236. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
237. Id.
238. 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (2001), does not preempt Massachusetts General Law § 307B).
239. 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998).
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 149-154 and accompanying text.
242. Phillip Morris II, 159 F.3d at 673.
243. Id. at 676 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). requiring that the
government "grant a benefit of real value" to compensate a taking).
244. Id. at 677.
245. Id. at 678.
246. Phillip Morris. Inc. v. Reilly. 113 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2000).
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recognized that trade secrets are viewed as property interests by Mas-
sachusetts.247 Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is
applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. However,
the court reasoned that states generally have broad police power and
plaintiffs must yield to this power where exercised appropriately. 248
This power is not absolute, however, and the taking of even intangible
property, such as the trade secrets here, may constitute a regulatory
taking.249 After undergoing an ad hoc analysis of the character of the
governmental action, the economic impact on plaintiffs, and the inter-
ference with the cigarette manufacturers' investment-backed expecta-
tions, the court concluded that 307B violated the Takings Clause.250
Therefore, the plaintiffs were granted summary judgment, and the
state was enjoined from enforcing the ingredient disclosure portion of
the statute. 251
c. Phillip Morris III
Massachusetts appealed to the First Circuit, seeking a reversal of
the district court's grant of summary judgment, in Phillip Morris III.252
In complete contrast to its opinion in Phillip Morris If, the court held
that 307B did not effect a constitutional taking without just compensa-
tion. 253 Specifically, the Phillip Morris III court held that requiring
disclosure of trade secrets was an appropriate exercise of state police
power, and because Massachusetts had not assured plaintiffs confiden-
tiality, the manufacturers had no reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation like that held dispositive under regulatory takings
authority.254 In addition, the Phillip Morris III court held that there
was no per se taking because the government was not forcing the man-
ufacturers to bear a public burden. 255 Rather, the court held that the
reasonable, investment-backed expectation of the plaintiffs was the
dispositive factor and concluded that since Massachusetts had not en-
sured confidentiality, the plaintiffs had notice that disclosure of trade
247. Id. at 142.
248. Id. at 143.
249. Id. at 142.
250. Id. at 145 (holding that the trade secrets amounted to property and that the state's taking
of such through disclosure requirements provided no compensation and therefore violated the
Takings Clause).
251. Id. at 145.
252. Phillip Morris. Inc. v. Reilly. 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Phillip Morris III).
This opinion has been withdrawn from bound volume pursuant to rehearing en banc.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 43 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.. 467 U.S. 986 (1984)).
255. Id.
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secrets would be required.25 6 The most complete retreat from its prior
decision is found in the court's reasoning that the manufacturers' con-
tinued business privilege of marketing and selling tobacco in Massa-
chusetts was just compensation for the required disclosures. 257 The
First Circuit found that Massachusetts's general statutory trade secret
protections do not afford the plaintiffs with a reasonable, investment-
backed expectation in the confidentiality of disclosures, and 307B
does not exempt trade secrets from disclosure. 25 Furthermore, the
court noted that the manufacturers' confidentiality right may be
subordinate to the state's valid exercise of police power to protect
public health.25 9
The Phillip Morris III decision met with strong dissent. The dissent-
ing opinion focused on the inconsistency between the court's opinion
in Phillip Morris H and the present decision.260 The dissenting judge
opined that, by allowing Massachusetts to exert its police power to
effect this taking, the court sacrificed "bedrock principle[s] of individ-
ual property rights in order to uphold a creative, but at best margin-
ally effective, response to a public health problem."'26' The dissenting
opinion also criticized the majority for allowing states to "ransack
trade secrets of virtually any business" without offering compensa-
tion.262 Although it recognized that this was a difficult case to decide,
the dissenting opinion established that complexity is no excuse for bad
law.
The dissent opined that Phillip Morris H encompassed the correct
understanding of the Takings Clause and related case authority.
Under this construction, the government must compensate for the use
of trade secrets by bestowing a real value on the plaintiff.263 The dis-
sent argued that the majority made three errors in Phillip Morris III.
First, the court failed to recognize the extent of the manufacturers'
property interest in their trade secrets. Massachussetts holds trade
secrets to be property interests, and therefore, they are property for
256. Id.
257. Id. (discussing that the protection of the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000), does
not confer an explicit promise of confidentiality that a party may rely on for a reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectation). See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
258. Phillip Morris 111, 267 F.3d 45. The court contrasts Section 307B with the federal Trade
Secrets Act and Texas's ingredient reporting statute, provisions that do give trade secrets
protection.
259. Id. at 36 (citing Corn Prod. Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919)).
260. Id. at 62.
261. Id. at 61.
262. Id.
263. Phillip Morris 11, 159 F.3d at 676.
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Takings Clause purposes. 264 The majority conceded that 307B will
likely result in making trade secrets public knowledge, which will sub-
stantially decrease, if not eliminate, the economic value of the manu-
facturers' property interests. 265 Despite this, the decision treats trade
secrets as "quasi-interests," effectively holding that the property inter-
est exists only until the state decides to regulate the underlying prod-
uct in which the secret lies.266 Under this view, since tobacco may be
regulated, the trade secrets surrounding its components may be regu-
lated as well. The dissent opined that the majority created a judicial
exception to takings in situations where the trade secret is part of a
regulated product. The problem with this analysis is that almost every
sector is regulated. It appears as though the majority was simply inte-
grating its own values about tobacco companies into the opinion. 267
The dissent considered the majority's second mistake to be the re-
striction of per se takings analysis to real property.268 A per se taking
may exist when the government applies a "permanent physical occu-
pation" or creates a rule that "deprives the property of all economi-
cally viable use."' 269 Surely, 307B falls into the latter category. A
trade secret loses economic value once it is made public. Despite this
clear rule, the majority limited a per se analysis to the regulation of
land effecting a taking.270 However, the court's third mistake is more
important for the purpose of this Comment.
The third mistake, according to the dissent, was that the majority
applied a failed Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, or regulatory takings, anal-
ysis.2 7 1 The court in Phillip Morris 1I rejected the state's argument
that the privilege of allowing the manufacturers to continue to do bus-
iness in the state was just compensation. 272 Under Monsanto, offering
a plaintiff no additional benefit over what it already had did not rise to
the level of compensation for a taking.273 Rather than relying on the
264. Phillip Morris I1, 267 F.3d at 63.
265. Id. at 64.
266. Id. at 65.
267. Id. at 61 (noting that while the dissenting judge is not a proponent of tobacco, personal
views should not affect the constitutional requirement of compensation for takings).
268. Id. at 67.
269. Id. at 65 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
270. Phillip Morris Ill. 267 F.3d at 69-71 (arguing that revealing a trade secret is like a perma-
nent land occupation because in both situations, the government is not taking "one strand of a
bundle of property rights" but rather the whole strand).
271. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
272. Phillip Morris II. 267 F.3d at 76. See also Phillip Morris 11. 159 F.3d at 676-77.
273. Phillip Morris 111 267 F.3d at 76 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986). See also Phillip
Morris II in which this very circuit stated that continuing to do business "does not offer the
Manufacturer anything more than what they already have. it does not afford due compensation
for a taking of valuable property rights." Phillip Morris I1, 159 F.3d at 678.
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proper Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) statutory period in
Monsanto, which the court followed in Phillip Morris H, the court
here relied on a period in which the Monsanto plaintiffs had acqui-
esced to disclosure by continuing to provide the government with its
trade secrets. 274 The Monsanto Court merely held that a party has no
reasonable, investment-backed expectation when the government
gives no assurances of confidentiality and the company discloses trade
secrets anyway.275 The dissent did not find this reasoning analogous
to the present case because the tobacco manufacturers never explicitly
nor implicitly acquiesced to 307B. To the contrary, they fought the
constitutionality of the statute since its inception. 276 The dissent con-
cluded by opining its favor of the Second Circuit rationale using prop-
erty acquisition to measure the time period for determining
investment-backed expectation, rather than enactment of a challenged
statute. 277
d. Phillip Morris IV
After the First Circuit's startling break from its Phillip Morris H
decision in Phillip Morris III, the plaintiffs sought a petition for re-
hearing en banc. On November 16, 2001, the court granted the peti-
tion and subsequently withdrew its Phillip Morris III opinion. 278 On
January 7, 2002, the case was reargued. Shortly before publication of
this Comment, the First Circuit issued its en banc opinion. 279 In Phil-
lip Morris IV, the court held that the 307B ingredient disclosure provi-
sion violated the Takings Clause, and thus affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment and injunctive relief for the plaintiffs. 280
The court reached this conclusion through a multi-part analysis.
The court first noted that Massachusetts's law does treat trade
secrets as valid property interests.281 Because the ingredients were
protected property, the court next underwent a takings analysis. The
court noted the factual, ad hoc analysis used for regulatory takings.,
but also recognized that one per se rule for this type of taking exists.
When a regulation denies an owner of all economic value, this is a per
274. Id. at 78.
275. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1009.
276. See supra notes 231-238 and accompanying text.
277. See Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC. 62 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 1995).
278. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45 (lst Cir. 2001). This opinion has been with-
drawn from bound volume pursuant to court order.
279. Although the new opinion assumes the role of Phillip Morris III. it is referred to as
Phillip Morris IV in this Comment to distinguish it from the withdrawn opinion.
280. Phillip Morris IV, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403.
281. Id. at 15.
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se taking.282 The court recognized that the Supreme Court has never
ruled that trade secrets or other intellectual property cannot be physi-
cally taken and so it would appear that the per se rule may apply in
these situations. 283 However, because the per se rule had only been
applied where real rather than personal property was at issue, the
court held that it should be considered, but not dispositive to the pre-
sent case. 284 Therefore, the court examined the case under the con-
trolling regulatory takings rationale of Monsanto, considering the
plaintiffs' reasonable, investment-backed expectations, the economic
impact of 307B ingredient disclosure, and the character of the govern-
ment action. 28 5 The court analogized 307B to the three EPA time pe-
riods under Monsanto: (1) where no right to confidentiality existed in
1947; (2) where the government guarantee of confidentiality gave
plaintiffs a reasonable, investment-backed expectation in 1972; and
(3) under the 1978 amendments which established that the govern-
ment could disclose trade secrets and therefore nullified plaintiffs'
reasonable, investment-backed expectations if they disclosed with
knowledge of this rule. 286
The Phillip Morris IV court held that 307B was distinct from both
the first and third Monsanto periods where no guarantee of confiden-
tiality existed.287 In addition, the court reasoned that the second
Monsanto scheme was similar to the present situation, but not disposi-
tive because in Monsanto, there was a direct guarantee of confidenti-
ality as opposed to here, where Massachusetts's law only generally
protects trade secrets. 288 Therefore, the court considered an earlier
twentieth century case considering whether a taking was effected
when plaintiffs were required to disclose ingredients. 289 Under this
authority, the court noted that plaintiffs may be required to disclose
"fair information" to consumers.290 However, the court noted that
fair information may include less than all of the ingredients required
282. Id. at 25 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
283. Id. at 26, n.7.
284. Id. at 27 (disagreeing with the concurring opinion, which held that Monsanto created a
per se rule that the government cannot require disclosure without violating the Takings Clause
where a trade secret owner establishes a reasonable investment-backed expectation of
confidentiality).
285. Id. at 32 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984)).
286. Phillip Morris IV, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 at *32-36.
287. Id. at 36.
288. Id. at 37-38.
289. Id. at 40 (citing Corn Products I1. 249 U.S. at 431-32).
290. Id. at 41.
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under 307B. 291 Based on this reasoning, and because Massachusetts
generally protects trade secrets, the court held that the cigarette man-
ufacturers did have a reasonable, investment-backed expectation of
confidentiality. 292
The court next considered the economic impact of 307B on the
plaintiffs' trade secrets and tersely concluded that because plaintiffs
had spent billions of dollars to create brand-specific formulas and
307B disclosure would make reverse engineering more possible, the
economic impact was "potentially tremendous. '293 Finally, the court
considered the character of the regulation and found this to be the
dispositive factor. The plaintiffs argued that 307B was a per se taking
because it ruined their ability to exclude competitiors from their trade
secrets and therefore destroyed the value of their secret formulas.294
The court agreed with this analysis, because 307B requires disclosure
that the state is not required to keep secret and under Monsanto, this
nullified the plaintiffs' property rights. 295 The 307B provisions that
disclosure will only occur if the state determines that it "could bene-
fit" public health and if the attorney general finds no unconstitutional
taking are inadequate because the burden on the government is too
low. 296 Rather, the court opined that the state could effect its interest
in public health just as well by requiring confidential disclosure of in-
gredients. 297 Therefore, because 307B destroys the plaintiffs' trade
secrets and the standard of "could benefit" public health does not jus-
tify the "potentially tremendous" loss, 307B constituted a taking with-
out just compensation. 298
The court also considered the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions because of the 307B provision that companies did not have to
disclose ingredients if they halted business in Massachusetts. In con-
trast to Phillip Morris III, which held that the right to continue busi-
ness in the state was just compensation for a taking, the Phillip Morris
IV court noted that persons cannot be forced to forego their constitu-
tional rights, such as the right to just compensation, in exchange for a
government benefit that has minimal connection to the property at
291. Id. at 42 (opining that disclosure of only harmful additives rather than all would best
serve the state's interest in protecting health).
292. Phillip Morris IV, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 at *43-44.
293. Id. at 44-45.
294. Id. at 45.
295. Id. at 47.
296. Id. at 47-48.
297. ld. at 54.
298. Phillip Morris IV, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 at *56.
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issue.299 Here, the court held that allowing plaintiffs to continue con-
ducting business in the state was not a valuable benefit on which their
rights could be conditioned. 300 Therefore, the state was enjoined from
enforcing the ingredient-disclosure provision of 307B, and the plain-
tiffs were granted summary judgment.
The concurring judge, who dissented from the withdrawn Phillip
Morris III decision, agreed with the result that the lead opinion
reached but disagreed with the analysis. Rather, the concurring opin-
ion argued that Monsanto had established a per se rule regarding trade
secret takings that a taking occurs if the government uses a trade se-
cret in which a plaintiff has a reasonable, investment-backed expecta-
tion of confidentiality without offering compensation. 301 Because the
plaintiffs had such an expectation as evidenced by their non-disclosure
and the government offered no real compensation, 307B violates the
Takings Clause.30 2
The dissent argued that because the present dispute was a facial
challenge to 307B, plaintiffs must satisfy the high standard of showing
that it would not be constitutional under any circumstances? °03 The
dissent opined that 307B does not automatically require that all ingre-
dients be disclosed, which would be unconstitutional. Where less than
all ingredients are required to be disclosed, 307B may be constitu-
tional and therefore, constitutionality must be analyzed based on the
application of 307B to individual circumstances. 30 4
III. ANALYSIS
As demonstrated, the area of economic rights has become a quag-
mire of jurisprudence. While those seeking redress for an infringe-
ment of their personal liberties may do so under various theories, the
proponent of economic liberties faces a much more difficult task. The
ruling of the Court in Saenz and the lower courts' eagerness to restore
weight to these rights may remove some of these hurdes.3 1°5 How-
ever, to ensure that the mistakes of earlier jurisprudence are not re-
peated, an in-depth analysis of the current problems and their
comparison to earlier ones is required. First, the proper role of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and how the Saenz decision affects
299. Id. at 57 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 52 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
300. Id. at 61.
301. Id. at 64.
302. Id. at 68.
303. Id. at 79.
304. Phillip Morris IV, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 at *80-83.
305. See Saenz, 526 U.S. 489: Craigmiles. 110 F. Supp. 2d 658.
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the application of that clause to economic liberties will be analyzed.31 6
Second, an analysis of the strain placed on the Due Process Clause by
the historical eradication of privileges or immunities will show that
economic due process was a necessary evil of that elimination. 30 7 The
question whether economic due process should remain dormant, or
may be applied moderately, is a necessary corollary to this examina-
tion. 308 Various alternatives will be explored to accomplish this task.
Finally, the strength of the Takings Clause will be explored in light of
the elusive Phillip Morris decisions. 30 9
A. The Proper Role of Privileges or Immunities
Suggesting the natural expiration of the Constitution every nineteen
years, Thomas Jefferson wrote to Madison, "'that the earth belongs in
usufruct to the living;' that the dead have neither powers nor rights
over it." ' 310 Nonetheless, it is the dead who left the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause in a dormant state. To this day, the reason why the
Slaughter-House Court chose to condemn the clause, despite its po-
tential for substance, is ambiguous. 311 No amount of speculation since
1873 has resolved that question nor is it likely that any scholar will
ever find the answer. It is more important to understand what the
clause means for litigants today than to review why it was abandoned
years ago.
Justice Field's dissent in Slaughter-House has proved prophetic. 31 2
Indeed, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was rendered a "vain and
idle enactment" for 130 years, until the Supreme Court's Saenz deci-
sion.31 3 However, legislative history does not infer that the clause was
meant to be ineffective. Rather, privileges or immunities standing
alone do not restrain state legislatures, and the goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment may likely have been to effect this restraint and force
states to respect fundamental rights.314 One scholar has suggested
that the most reasonable interpretation of the clause is as a "delega-
tion to future constitutional decision-makers" to protect implicit con-
306. See infra notes 310-453 and accompanying text.
307. See infra notes 454-489 and accompanying text.
308. See infra notes 490-560 and accompanying text.
309. See infra notes 561-671 and accompanying text.
310. ELY. supra note 51, at 11 (discussing that the judiciary should enforce the Constitution
rather than value inferences).
311. Id. at 18 (noting the complication of statutory construction resulting from the lack of
records regarding the Fourteenth Amendment debates).
312. See supra notes 40-68 and accompanying text.
313. See Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). But see Saenz, 526 U.S. 489.
314. See ELY, supra note 51. at 26.
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stitutional rights never enumerated. 31 5 Existing legislative history
indicates that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly
referred to Corfield v. Coryell,316 which held that fundamental privi-
leges found in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause fall
under the general categories of "[p]rotection by the government, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good for the whole. ' '317 The second category
clearly encompasses economic rights. Certainly, the Saenz plaintiff
sought to enjoy life and liberty through the acquisition of necessary
welfare benefits.
Although restricted for years, speculation has abounded for the last
two decades that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be re-
stored. One scholar noted that the clause is experiencing an "aca-
demic renaissance. ' 318  Another has proposed an approach to
reconstruct the clause. 31 9 Such reconstruction would require deter-
mining whether a challenged law affects a privilege or immunity and,
if so, whether that impact violates equality principles. 320 The author
distinguishes his argument from the popular characterization of the
clause as offering substantive protection, and argues that it was in-
tended to be an equality-based protection. 321 Under this approach,
the intent of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to require states
to confer the same privileges or immunities to everyone, regardless of
what those privileges were. 322 The argument concludes that the Equal
Protection Clause has been overburdened with performing the proper
functions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as the next section
argues also occurred with the Due Process Clause. 323
315. Id. at 29.
316. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
317. ELY, supra note 51. at 28-29 (discussing how the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
repeatedly referenced the Corfield v. CoDnell. 6 F. Cas 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.3.230). inter-
pretation of Article IV in attempting to define privileges and immunities in the Fourteenth
Amendment counterpart).
318. CURTIS, supra note 36. at 8 (stating that "if recent scholarship is any indication, there is
reason to hope that the clause may once again enjoy the central role in the protection of civil
liberties envisioned for it by its Framers").
319. Harrison. supra note 2. at 1386.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1387.
322. Id. at 1388.
323. Id. at 1394. In theory, this argument could also provide an explanation for why the Saenz
Court did not rely on the Equal Protection Clause, as the lower courts did. and which would
have been within the bounds of established law.
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One scholar contends that academics of the clause have taken one
of three varying positions concerning the proper scope of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, derived from originalist analyses. 324 The
first "camp" is by far the broadest, arguing that a widespread defini-
tion is as plausible as the original understanding of privileges or im-
munities as a limited one.325 The second theory takes the more
compromising position that privileges or immunities are best under-
stood as references to fundamental rights only,326 and the third well-
known argument takes the extremist ground that the provision is "ob-
literated past deciphering" as though by an inkblot. 327 Kenyon
Bunch's recent argument analyzes the three theories using his own
test for determining originalist meaning and concludes that the clause
is best left as a partial inkblot. 328 This Comment concludes that the
more moderate, fundamental rights approach is the most suitable for
revival of the clause. The importance of these arguments is evident in
the fact that the Court purports to look to the original meaning of the
Constitution in its decision, such as in Saenz.
1. Justifications for an Expansive Reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause
Among the strongest supporters of this approach are scholars
Michael Perry and John Harrison. 329 The main premise of this view is
that the modern Court's activist decisions, which others believe to be
value implementations, can be squared with original intent.330 Impor-
tant to the success of this theory is Perry's belief that originalism does
not preclude judges from choosing one viewpoint just because it may
lend more support to an activist decision. 33' Under this analysis, privi-
leges or immunities protect a broad category of freedoms on which
reliance could justify almost any activist decision. 332 Perry purports
324. See Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original Understanding of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause: Michael Perry's Justification for Judicial Activism or Robert Bork's Constitutional Ink-
blot?. 10 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 321. 324 (2000) (analyzing the three general divisions of
thought on the scope of privileges or immunities and concluding that the clause is better viewed
as a partial inkblot).
325. Id. at 324.
326. Id. (discussing and citing RAOUL BERGER. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BnL OF RIGHTS (Univ. of Okla. Press 1989)).
327. Id. at 325 (citing BORK, supra note 36. at 166).
328. Id. at 412 (arguing that completely nullifying the clause may be erroneous because legis-
lative records reveal that a "constitution-amending majority" of Framers intended the clause to
envelop at least the protections given in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Bill of Rights).
329. See PERRY, supra note 76; Harrison, supra note 2.
330. See Bunch. supra note 324. at 322.
331. Id. at 323 (citing PERRY. supra note 76. at 54-69).
332. Id. at 324.
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that the Framers' dominant view was just as likely to have been a
broad interpretation of privileges or immunities as a more limited
one. 333 Another scholar has opined that analyzing the Framers' intent
is not impossible, despite the many originalist intentions that
existed. 334
Perry recognizes that, despite his belief that the Framers intended
to encompass a broad range of rights under privileges or immunities,
the Court has instead relied on substantive due process or equal pro-
tection to support these rights. 335 Although he argues that this reli-
ance on other Fourteenth Amendment clauses is mistaken from a
broad originalist perspective, he concludes that the problem does not
undermine the decision's legitimacy. Rather, he finds it important
only that some clause supports the decision, rather than the right
clause. 336 If all that is required is that some clause supports a holding,
then almost all activist judicial decisions can find support. This is be-
cause, under Perry's understanding, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was meant to protect all privileges or immunities granted
under state and federal law as well as the "freedom of citizens to do,
or to refrain from doing, as he or she wants, in the 'pursuit' (as the
Declaration says) of his or her 'happiness.' ' '337
Privileges or immunities would certainly encompass economic liber-
ties under this view. Furthermore, this reading invites "future deci-
sion-makers," hence the modern Court, to decide what privileges or
immunities persons have.33s This directive, if taken literally, would
certainly lead to judicial value implementation in an equally broad, if
not broader, sense than the Lochner era decisions. As this Comment
will expand upon later, this would indeed be a slippery slope from
which the demise of privileges or immunities at the very beginning of
the clause's substance could be predicted.33 9
The further importance of this broad view is that it supports the
notion that the Bill of Rights' freedoms, protected against abridgment
by the federal government, were meant to apply to the states through
333. Id.
334. Richard S. Kay. Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses. 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226. 247-51 (1988) (arguing that adjudica-
tion through construction of original intent is possible despite multiple intentions, because the
breadth does not indicate contradiction. but rather reflects the multitude of Framers involved).
335. See PERRY, supra note 76, at 136.
336. Id. at 137.
337. Id. at 127.
338. Id. at 192-204.
339. See infra notes 629-630 and accompanying text.
2002]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.340 This, of course, is in direct
contrast to the holding of the Slaughter-House decision, which was fi-
nally called into question by the Saenz Court. This recent develop-
ment, as analyzed later, implicates that the Court, although not ready
to overturn Slaughter-House, is finally moving in that direction. The
fact that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights against state abridgment is supported by the
argument that one of the most important issues to the Framers of the
clause was political power. 341 This is indeed supported by the fact that
the Fourteenth Amendment enactors considered the circumstances
under which readmittance of southern states to the Union would be
allowed. 342 In fact, ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was a
prerequisite to readmitting those states into the Union.343
Perry also argues that scholars are in agreement that the Framers
intended to protect all privileges or immunities granted under state
law.344 These include fundamental rights to life and liberty as well as
property and contract rights.345 Under this framework, a state
abridges such a right by passing a law that would be unconstitutional if
it were federal. 346 Therefore, analysis of what privileges or immuni-
ties were protected under the original Constitution's counterpart to
the clause, Article IV, is helpful.
Most scholars, as well as the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, have looked to Corfield v. Coryel3 47 for guidance in construing
that provision. Part of the opinion focuses on privileges or immunities
that all citizens of free governments hold. These include "protection
by government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
340. See Bunch. supra note 324 (citing CURTIS, supra note 36). But see Charles Fairman. Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949) (opining that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not effect the Bill of
Rights' application to the states). Incorporation was subsequently accomplished through the
Due Process Clause instead.
341. See CURTIS. supra note 36. at 13.
342. Id. at 14.
343. See Bunch, supra note 324, at 362 (noting that the Framers did not include voting rights
to African-Americans in the discussion of privileges or immunities because southern states
would not have ratified this inclusion).
344. See PERRY, supra note 76, at 124.
345. Id. at 124.
346. Id. at 127.
347. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3.230).
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whole. '348 This construction is broad indeed, and economic liberties
would surely be considered privileges or immunities if this were the
view that the Fourteenth Amendment Framers held. However, a later
reference to fundamental rights in the opinion suggests, as does
Bunch's "second group" of Fourteenth Amendment scholars, that the
scope of privileges or immunities was limited to protection of funda-
mental rights. However, before we reach this argument, we must ex-
plore another aspect of the expansive perspective.
In attempting reconstruction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Harrison identified two factors that must be considered. 349 First, one
must determine whether the law affects a privilege or immunity. Sec-
ond, whether that effect violates equality principles must be deter-
mined.350 The core of this theory rests on differentiating between
substantive and equality-based protections.35' Harrison argues that
the clause was intended to act as an equality-based limitation on the
government. 352 In that regard, privileges or immunities do not deter-
mine the constitutionality of the challenged state law's substance, but
rather, require that it be the same for all citizens. 353 Therefore, if a
state law changes the content as it applies to everyone, there is no
abridgment. On the other hand, an abridgment exists if a state law
limits only one group's rights. 354 Because the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has traditionally focused on the substance of the law, the
Equal Protection Clause has been left to bear the burden of its role. 355
As this Comment will examine, the Saenz decision seems to comport
with this view by relying on the dead Privileges or Immunities Clause
for a traditional equal protection job.356
348. Id. at 551-52. Perry relies on this broad portion of the opinion to support his expansive
view. See PERRY, supra note 76, at 125.
349. See Harrison, supra note 2. at 1385.
350. Id. at 1386.
351. Id. at 1387.
352. Id. at 1388.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See Harrison. supra note 2, at 1391.
356. See Stacev L. Winick. Comment, A New Chapter in Constitutional Law: Saenz v. Roe
and the Revival of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. 28 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 573 (1999) (analyzing why the Saenz Court chose to rely on Privileges or Immunities for an
Equal Protection issue).
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2. The Moderate "Fundamental Rights" Approach to Privileges or
Immunities
Perry asserts that most scholars agree that the clause was meant to
protect privileges or immunities granted under state law.357 However,
a large group of Fourteenth Amendment scholars view the Framers'
intent as protecting only a small set of fundamental rights. 358 From an
originalist perspective, this view proposes that it is more reasonable to
accept a limited meaning of privileges or immunities when the histori-
cal analysis is uncertain, as it certainly is under the present clause. 359
Scholars Raoul Berger and Earl Maltz are two leading contenders of
this viewpoint. 360
Berger argues that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 represents the outer
limit of the Framers' intended protection of privileges or immuni-
ties.361 Support for this theory is found in the Fourteenth Amendment
debates, which relied largely on Corfield v. Coryel 362 and its analysis
of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause for guidance.
Contrary to Perry's assertion, scholars following this line of thought
conclude that Article IV privileges and immunities were given narrow
protection by the Corfield Court. 363 Only fundamental rights were
protected rather than all rights associated with state citizenship. 364
Evidence exists that this fundamental rights view was present in the
Fourteenth Amendment debates. 365  In his introduction of the
Amendment to the Senate, Senator Howard stated its purpose as pre-
cluding state laws that violated fundamental rights of citizens.366 Fun-
damental rights at the time of enactment are believed to have been
understood as civil rights not created by government but those natural
to men. 367 In contrast, non-fundamental rights were those created by
government and therefore left to state governments to freely regu-
late.3 68 Scholars point to the exclusion of political rights from protec-
357. See PERRY. supra note 76, at 124.
358. See EARL M. MALTZ. CIVIL RIGHTS. THE CONSTITUTION. AND CONGRESS. 1863-69 (Univ.
Press of Kan. 1990): BERGER, supra note 326.
359. See Bunch, supra note 324, at 329-30.
360. Id. at 324.
361. See Berger, supra note 158, at 169.
362. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
363. See generally MALTZ. supra note 358.
364. See Bunch, supra note 324, at 343.
365. Id. at 346.
366. Id. at 345 (citing CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866)).
367. Id. at 347.
368. Id. However, a problem with distinguishing based on fundamental rights versus natural
law is that people's beliefs about what is natural vary.
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tion as evidence that Framers supported a limitation on fundamental
rights. 369
Debates about racial desegregation in Congress following the Four-
teenth Amendment illustrate the protective distinction between fun-
damental rights and other rights.370 These indicate congressional
beliefs that attending school was a legislative right and therefore not
fundamental. 37' Consequently, school desegregation, or the right to
attend any school, was not a privilege or immunity deserving protec-
tion. 372 Conversely, the right to travel was viewed as a fundamental
right and, therefore, laws could not abridge the privilege of travel on a
racial basis. 373 This latter fundamental right argument certainly finds
a modicum of support in the recent Saenz decision, also finding the
right to travel to be fundamental. 374 The limited construction of what
privileges or immunities were meant to protect also substantially
weakens the argument that the clause was intended to protect all
rights given by state law, because this category is much broader than
the former. However, this analysis is not completely harmful to eco-
nomic liberties. At least two scholars believe that even if privileges or
immunities are limited to the fundamental rights found in the Civil
Rights Act, the "right to work at one's occupation of choice" is found
within this category. Thus, this right is protected as a privilege or im-
munity.375 For this reason, and to avoid potential cries of illegitimacy
if the Court turned to the expansive protection of privileges or immu-
nities, this Comment concludes that this approach is best for the Court
to adhere to in its early stages of reviving the clause.
369. Id. at 348 (citing CoNc. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1866)) (establishing that enac-
tors did not think privileges or immunities included voting or other non-fundamental rights be-
cause they derived from law, not nature). But see WILLIAM NELSON. THE FoURTEENrH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPAL TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 125 (1988) (arguing the
plausibility that political rights were afforded protection by the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
370. See Bunch, supra note 324. at 368.
371. Id. at 371.
372. Id. (citing CONG. GLOE. 42d Cong.. 2d Sess.. app. 3-4 (1872)). Of course. it is likely that
the right to attend school would be considered a natural right today.
373. Id. at 371.
374. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 498.
375. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEASi DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (Bobbs-Merrill Co.. Inc.
1962). See also Bunch, supra note 324, at 391 (stating that it is possible that a "constitution-
amending majority" recognized an upper category beyond the Civil Rights Act's enumerated
rights in which this economic liberty may be included). This is also an example of how a privi-
leges or immunities argument is better suited for economic liberty issues than a substantive due
process rationale if applied to the Craigniies issue of the plaintiffs' right to sell caskets as their
chosen occupation).
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3. Privileges or Immunities as an "Inkblot"
The most disastrous line of thought toward restoration of economic
liberties based on privileges or immunities is Judge Robert Bork's
analysis. 376 The overall premise of Bork's argument is that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause has never been understood, and therefore,
the provision should be treated as though an inkblot has eliminated
the possibility of ever understanding it.377 Bork's disdain for the
Court's attempts to decipher the meaning of privileges or immunities
lies in the inevitable judicial value judgments that would result.378 His
analysis surveys the reasons for striking economic regulations and
abortion laws and finds them similar in that no constitutional reason
was given for either. 379
In Bork's opinion, the Slaughter-House Court rightfully limited a
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that would otherwise have
left the Court "at large in the field of public policy without any guide-
lines other than the views of its members. ' 380 In his view, the Four-
teenth Amendment was only intended to protect the newly freed
slaves. Extending the protection to other privileges or immunities
would therefore leave only the Court's application of its personal
views. 381 In this respect, even the fundamental rights analysis dis-
cussed above is too expansive for Bork's liking. He notes the con-
trasting view of the fundamental rights understanding as one allowing
courts to strike down any law not valued at the time.382 Therefore, the
Court's subsequent move from Slaughter-House judicial moderation
to the "evils" of judicial value-making through substantive due pro-
cess in Lochner is contemptible. 38 3
4. Bunch's Originalist Intent of the "Constitution-Amending
Majority" of Framers as Support for a Partial Inkblot
In construing the above three camps of scholarly opinion about
what privileges or immunities protect, the fourth analysis takes issue
376. See BORK, supra note 36, at 15.
377. Id. at 166.
378. Id. at 16 (opining that an activist judge cannot help himself from doing what he believes
is best in construing a statute).
379. Id. at 17.
380. Id. at 37.
381. Id. at 38.
382. See BORK, supra note 36, at 39 (citing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 197 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1985)).
383. Id. at 44.
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with at least one aspect of each of them.384 This analysis tests the
above theories based on whether the number of enactors holding a
narrow view of the privileges or immunities definition was large
enough that a constitution-amending majority could not have been
reached without their support.385 Bunch concludes, under this test,
that the rights a "constitution-amending majority" of Framers would
have considered privileges or immunities was much more limited than
the expansive definition proposed by Perry and others. 386 The author
notes that under this result, the modern Court's activist decisions can-
not be justified. 387 Therefore, the Saenz Court's inclusion of privi-
leges or immunities may be too broad if attempting to adhere to
originalism, which the Court is mandated to do to retain its
legitimacy.388
It was soon apparent to Bunch under his developed test that Perry's
approach is much too broad. This is because the only protection a
constitution-amending majority of the Framers agreed on was that
privileges or immunities included the freedoms found in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.389 Instead, he believes that the most restrictive
comprehension of privileges or immunities was more likely to be the
original intent than a broader understanding. 390
In applying the test to the fundamental rights realm, Bunch recog-
nizes that a fundamental rights view was widespread in the enacting
Congress.391 However, the scope of fundamental rights must be un-
derstood in the Framers' historical context rather than that which has
developed through modern jurisprudence. 392 Admittedly, this scope
was narrower. Privileges or immunities did not refer to all natural
rights or the rights of state citizenship.393 Even if a constitution-
amending majority supported a fundamental rights definition of privi-
384. See Bunch. supra note 324. at 326 (stating generally that the "dominant view- approach
taken by all three scholars is erroneous, because all that is needed to eliminate a broader defini-
tion and support a narrower view is to illustrate that the number of Framers with the narrower
view was large enough such that there would be no constitution-amending majority without their
support).
385. Id. at 326-27.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 333.
390. See Bunch. supra note 324. at 338 (citing Richard S. Kay. Adherence to the Original Inten-
tions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses. 82 Nw. U. L. RF\,. 226.
266-69 (1988).
391. Id. at 368.
392. Id. at 373.
393. Id. at 371 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.. 2d Sess.. app. 3-4 (1872)).
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leges or immunities, the scope of fundamental rights was more limited
than what we understand today.394
Bunch concludes that Perry's broad view is erroneous because the
number of Framers believing that privileges or immunities were re-
stricted to fundamental rights is so great as to undermine the possibil-
ity of Perry's expansion. 395 However, it is plausible, but uncertain,
whether that number even included a constitution-amending major-
ity.396 The only definitive evidence shows that a constitution-amend-
ing majority believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected freedoms granted by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and per-
haps some Bill of Rights freedoms. 397 Therefore, Bork's analogy of
the provision to a complete inkblot is too restrictive in Bunch's view,
because some protection was intended. However, he easily sees the
clause as a "partial inkblot" because the enactors' views of fundamen-
tal rights were numerous and unclear.
5. Which Originalist Approach Did the Saenz Court Follow?
There can no longer be doubt that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is enjoying a "renaissance," both academic398 and judicial in
nature. 399 However, both the breadth of this renaissance and whether
it comports with the original intent is disputed. 400 The Saenz Court
illustrates the underlying necessity for the rebirth of the clause
through its very reliance on it. This is because the Court could have
easily and uncontroversially relied upon the equal protection analysis
it has been using for years in right to travel cases such as Saenz.40 1
Therefore, it is important to determine why the Court broke with pre-
cedent and the implications for this under an expansive understanding
of privileges or immunities.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 411.
396. See Bunch, supra note 324, at 411.
397. Id. at 412.
398. See CURTIS, supra note 36, at 8 (noting that "if recent scholarship is any indication, there
is reason to hope that the Privileges or Immunities Clause may yet enjoy the central role the
Framers envisioned for it").
399. Saenz, 526 U.S. 489.
400. See BORK, supra note 36, at 39 (opining that the Slaughter-House Cases were properly
decided for the sake of judicial moderation and that Lochnerism problems will arise from invok-
ing the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
401. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982) (holding that a state distinction based on
length of residency violated equal protection): Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 622 (1969)
(holding that restricting welfare benefits of new state citizens violated equal protection princi-
ples against individuals for exercising their right to travel).
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a. A Substitute for Equal Protection
As reviewed above, at least one scholar believes that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was meant to be an equality-based protection
rather than a substantive protection. 41°2 Under this analysis, the point
of the clause is to require every state to give the same privileges or
immunities to all.40 3 Obviously, the California statute at issue in
Saenz violates this by limiting welfare benefits to new residents to the
amount they received in their state of prior residence. This is an ex-
pansive reading of privileges or immunities and one that substitutes
the previously dead clause for the Equal Protection Clause. However,
this is exactly the path the Saenz Court appeared to take in breaking
with the Court's precedent.
The Court could easily have relied on thirty years of decisions using
equal protection to invalidate durational residency requirements such
as that encompassed in the California statute.40 4 However, in its
never-ending duty to legitimize its decisions, the Court needed an
analysis other than equal protection to give the right to travel the con-
stitutional basis it was lacking. 405 In Shapiro v. Thompson,4°16 the
Court opined that it was unnecessary to delegate a constitutional
home to the right to travel because it was a basic concept of the coun-
try that citizens have this freedom. However, in Saenz, as opposed to
the Shapiro line of cases, the Court found that the real dispute was
over the right to settle rather than the right to travel through the
states.40 7 Therefore, the rights encompassed within the right to travel,
namely, to enter and leave the state and to be treated as a visitor while
there, were settled. 4°t 8 However, the right to be treated like other citi-
zens, if staying, was not settled. 40 9 The Court found the additional pro-
tection it sought for this right in the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause, noting that this was modeled after
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.41t
Why did the Court not simply rely on this latter clause? Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor previously offered this solution in her concur-
402. See Harrison. supra note 2. at 1388.
403. Id.
404. See Winick. supra note 356. at 581.
405. Id. at 585.
406. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
407. See Winick. supra note 356. at 586.
408. Id.
409. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 492.
410. Id.
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ring opinion in Zobel v. Williams.411 Instead of following O'Connor's
approach or its own precedent, the Court chose to revive the Four-
teenth Amendment provision. In doing so, the Court noted that not-
withstanding the controversy over the inclusion of privileges or
immunities, the clause was thought to protect the right to migrate. 41 2
However, the majority found support for this premise from Slaughter-
House, the very case that eliminated the clause. 413 Therefore, the
Court effectively resurrected the Fourteenth Amendment provision
without overruling the Slaughter-House Cases and used the "words of
the Slaughter-House Court to bring back the clause that it had
killed." 41 4
The Court's activist resurrection of the clause was received with
widespread support. Both conservatives and liberals seemed to sup-
port the decision, though for different reasons. 41 5 Conservatives sup-
ported reviving the clause because it leads to enhanced possibilities
for economic liberties as this Comment proposes.416 Liberals ap-
plauded the plausibility of future protection for fundamental rights. 417
However, the victory will be short-lived and the clause will not reach
its potential for protection if the Slaughter-House Cases are not defini-
tively overruled. 418
Under Harrison's theory that privileges or immunities are equality-
based, the rights included in the clause do not provide direction on
substance but require that it simply affect all citizens the same. 419
Therefore, a state violates a privilege or immunity when taking that
right from one group, but is well within its power to change the sub-
stance of the right for everyone. 420 It is the Privileges or Immunities
Clause that constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866, rather than
the Equal Protection Clause.421 Harrison supports this theory through
411. 457 U.S. 55, 73-74 (1982) (O'Connor. J., concurring) (opining in concurrence that the
right to travel should rest on Article IV, Section 2 because it was important to establish a certain
basis for the right).
412. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 496.
413. Id. (citing the Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
414. See Winick, supra note 356, at 594.
415. Id. at 598.
416. Id. (citing Clint Bolick, Back from the Grave: The Supreme Court Exhumes the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities' Clause, LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 1999. at 19).
417. Id. (citing Joan Biskupic. New-Resident Limits on Welfare Rejected: Court Stresses Equal-
ity; Md. Law Affected. WASH. POST, May 18, 1999, at A1) (quoting Harvard law Professor Lau-
rence H. Tribe for the premise that the decision may give fundamental rights a more secure
constitutional basis).
418. Id. at 599.
419. See Harrison, supra note 2. at 1388.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1390.
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the language of the clauses, determining that equal protection in-
cludes all people, rather than protecting just citizens, as privileges or
immunities do.422 Furthermore, equal protection's goal is primarily
"the protection of equal laws," focusing on administering law in an
equal way. 423
b. Privileges or Immunities Protection for Fundamental Rights and
Saenz
The Saenz Court held that the fundamental rights protected by priv-
ileges or immunities include the right of citizens to pass through or
reside in another state.424 In so holding, the Court relied on Corfield
v. Cor vell,425 as did the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in
construing privileges or immunities. This reliance lends judicial sup-
port to the scholars who believe that the clause was intended to pro-
tect fundamental rights. The Court recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment overruled the limited protection of the Article IV coun-
terpart to rights under state law.426 This is important to recognize,
because under Article IV, freed blacks were not considered citizens of
all states due to the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision. 427
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment gave the broader protection
of granting privileges or immunities for all citizens.428 This lent weight
to fundamental rights, commonly understood at the enactors' time to
include rights of contract, 429 and therefore important for the protec-
tion of economic liberties. The controversy lies in whether the Court
understands fundamental rights to be the outer limit of privileges or
immunities. It appears it may not, since the Court extended protec-
tion to state-created rights. 430
The right to welfare is not a fundamental, but rather a state-created
right. Therefore, under the fundamental rights theory, it would not be
a protected privilege or immunity. 431 However, the Saenz Court was
concerned with the right of citizens to settle in a state and receive all
422. Id.
423. 1d.
424. Saenz. 526 U.S. 489.
425. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3.230) (construing the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. Section 2 to protect fundamental rights).
426. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 503.
427. See Winick, supra note 356. at 592 (citing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857)).
428. Id. at 593.
429. See Harrison. supra note 2. at 1391.
430. Saenz. 526 U.S. 489.
431. See MALTZ. supra note 358, at 335-39.
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the benefits to which long-term residents were privy. 432 Therefore,
the argument could be made that Perry's expansive definition of in-
cluding state rights in privileges or immunities was relied upon.4 33 In
fact, this was the Saenz dissent's very disagreement with the decision.
The dissenting opinion, while not completely opposed to resuscitating
privileges or immunities, noted that the proper originalist perspective
points to protection of fundamental rights only, rather than every
state law benefit. 434 While this expansive view would offer broader
protection to economic liberties, the dangers of illegitimacy due to
value implementation included in this broad approach will be ana-
lyzed in Part IV. 435 It is important to limit the newly bestowed protec-
tive realm of privileges or immunities to fundamental rights in order
to adhere to the original intent and to avoid illegitimacy that may
threaten revival of the clause so soon after its invocation. The Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause has already been killed once immediately
after its birth. 436 The Court should take care to avoid a similar fate for
it upon its revival.
c. No Longer an "Inkblot"
Although a few scholars may mourn the tenuous reversal of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as a nullity, they may not deny that
the law is changing. Judge Bork concurs with the Slaughter-House
Court that bestowing more weight to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause would make the Court "a perpetual censor on all legislation of
the States. ' 437 His objections are based mainly on the inappropriate-
ness of judicial review of state legislation that he theorizes would re-
sult from privileges or immunities as it did under substantive due
process theory.438 One problem with this argument is that the Slaugh-
ter-House Court itself dealt in value imposition by removing rights
from the Constitution.439 There is no support for why this is any less
dangerous than imposing rights into the Constitution, as the modern
Court often does. 440 Support for this is found in the post-Fourteenth
Amendment enacting Congress, stating that "every word of written
432. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07.
433. See PERRY, supra note 76. at 125.
434. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 522 (Thomas. J.. dissenting).
435. See infra notes 686-687 and accompanying text.
436. Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
437. See BORK. supra note 36. at 38.
438. Id. at 40.
439. See Winick, supra note 356, at 599 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1871)).
440. Id. See also Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the right of privacy was
encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights): Zablocki v. Redhail. 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (finding the fundamental right to marry under the Equal Protection and Due Process
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law should be given effect when possible."'441 The Saenz Court seems
to have lent credence to this argument in relying on the Slaughter-
House dissent as well as its majority.
Under the constitution-amending majority theory supporting partial
inkblot treatment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Saenz
decision was wrong. The number of enactors believing the clause was
limited to fundamental rights precludes the broad inclusion of state-
created rights of welfare as privileges or immunities in Saenz.442 How-
ever, this is not fatal to privileges or immunities protection of eco-
nomic liberties because the right to work at one's chosen occupation
may be viewed as an upper limit of fundamental rights. 443 Further-
more, if Saenz actually involved the right to settle in a state and re-
ceive benefits of state citizenship rather than welfare, then it was
arguably decided correctly because the former right is fundamental.
6. Saenz's Inconsistency with Slaughter-House and the Path Taken
The path less taken is not always the better one. While superficially
inconsistent with Slaughter-House, the Saenz decision did not overrule
Slaughter-House, but it took a tentative step in that direction. While
the Slaughter-House holding effectively eliminated the clause from ju-
risprudence for 130 years, 444 this does not mean that it was the correct
approach. Rather, the decision has caused disarray among other pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause.445 As reviewed above, eradication of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has placed undue pressure on the Equal Protection
Clause.446 Furthermore, at least one scholar theorizes that the Court
has been left to rely on the Due Process Clause substantively to vali-
date decisions actually supported by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.447 This theory will be expanded upon in analyzing whether
Lochner and its progeny mistakenly emphasized "liberty protected
against deprivation" rather than "privileges and immunities protected
Clauses): Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing a right to die despite
holding that no such right existed under the facts of this case).
441. See Winick. supra note 356.
442. See Bunch. supra note 324, at 412.
443. See BICKEL. supra note 375. at 102 (stating that the right to work is included in the Civil
Rights Act. which holds the fundamental rights that privileges or immunities are believed to
encompass).
444. See Winick. supra note 356, at 573 (noting that before Saenz. the provision was consid-
ered a nonentity by lawyers and professors alike).
445. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 527 (Thomas, J.. dissenting).
446. See Harrison. supra note 2. at 1391.
447. See PERRY. supra note 76. at 161.
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against abridgement. ' 448 Scholars also support that the resurrection
of privileges or immunities is necessary to remove weight wrongly
placed on the Takings Clause. 449
If the Slaughter-House result was accurate in strongly limiting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is unlikely that such disarray and
pressure would have been placed on these other provisions. While
hindsight alone cannot justify reversing a decision, such strong evi-
dence of the weaknesses of this result is somewhat dispositive. The
Saenz Court seemed to recognize this, at least in the context of the
impropriety of increased reliance on equal protection that it rejected.
Therefore, while the Saenz holding is inconsistent with Slaughter-
House, one must recognize the controversy of the latter decision itself
and the strong dissents.
Slaughter-House was a 5-4 decision in which the dissenters strongly
disagreed with the majority.450 Reevaluation of such a weak decision
130 years later, with the benefit of hindsight, is hardly irrational. That
the Saenz decision was reached by a 7-2 majority also illustrates the
propriety of the decision. 451 If the precedent truly had strong roots, it
is unlikely that such a majority could be reached in a landmark break
with precedent, and that even the dissent would agree with the under-
lying proposition to reevaluate the clause. 452 The Saenz dissent's di-
rectives to reevaluate the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
determine whether the clause should change or enhance substantive
due process analysis 453 necessitates review of that line of decisions in
the context of its birthplace, economic liberties.
448. Id. at 163.
449. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman. Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation. 66
U. CMi. L. REV. 1081. 1086 n.17 (1999) (opining that Barron v. Baltimore. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
correctly restricted the Takings Clause to federal government actions and that limitations of state
appropriations are better analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Clause).
450. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
451. Justice Stevens issued the Court's opinion in Saenz. in which Justices O'Connor. Scalia.
Kennedy, Souter. Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
offered separate dissenting opinions.
452. Saenz. 526 U.S. at 527-28 (Thomas, J.. dissenting) (stating that although he disagreed that
this was the right case in which to reevaluate privileges or immunities, he was open to such
reconsideration in an "appropriate case." because the "demise of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has contributed in no small part to our current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
453. Id.
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B. The Turbulence of Economic Due Process
As established, the eradication of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is widely believed to have been a partial reason for the judicial
creation of substantive due process. Both proponents and opponents
of reviving the clause agree on that much.454 One scholar argues that
the constitutional source for the Court's evaluation of state economic
regulation is not the Due Process Clause, but rather the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. 455 The basis for this belief lies in the distinction
between the two clauses' focal points. The Due Process Clause pro-
tects against deprivations of liberty while the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects against abridgement of privileges.456 In the scholar's
view, the Lochner Court erroneously emphasized the bakers' liberties
to work whatever hours they desired when the focus should properly
have been the bakers' privilege of freedom of occupation.457 In doing
so, the Court wrongly focused on the substantiality of the state's as-
serted health benefit balanced against the cost, instead of on whether
the legislature could reasonably have concluded that the balance was
justifiable. 458 This is wrong because of the necessary value imposi-
tions and the resulting premise that the Constitution contains some
specific economic theory.459 The result is that the duties of the legisla-
ture and judiciary are blurred because the Court asks itself if the state
is reasonably regulating for the public good rather than whether the
legislature had a rational basis for believing they were doing such. 460
However, left without the shield of privileges or immunities, the Court
had no other way to review economic regulations.
Another scholar basically agrees with the above result, but dis-
agrees that this right of review exists in privileges or immunities any
more than in substantive due process.46 I Rather, the Court simply
could not resist the idea that implicit rights could be read into the
Constitution as argued, but rejected, in Slaughter-House.462 The well-
454. See PERRY, supra note 76, at 161 (opining that the Court has traditionally used the Due
Process Clause to support decisions that are more logically supported by the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause): BORK. supra note 36. at 40 (noting that the Court -created" substantive due
process one year after eviscerating protection of privileges or immunities).
455. See PERRY. supra note 76. at 162.
456. 1d. at 163.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 165.
459. Id. at 164 (citing Lochner. 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (arguing that the
Constitution holds no certain economic theory for the Court to enforce).
460. Id. at 166. 168.
461. See BORK. supra note 36. at 40.
462. Id. (recognizing that the Slaughter-House majority used the very premise it rejected one
year later, simply placing it under another clause).
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documented result was the Lochner era and its creation of substantive
due process. 463 As examined above, this result is often viewed as
"evil" and has been described as the "quintessence of judicial usurpa-
tion of power. ' 464 For present purposes, it is important to determine
whether there is truth to this view and, accordingly, whether economic
substantive due process should remain dormant or may be moderately
applied.
1. Lochnerism Evility: Truth or Hypocrisy?
A puzzling aspect of the near universal agreement that Lochner was
constitutionally erroneous is that the Court continues to use substan-
tive due process in realms outside of economic liberties. 465 The Court
has often focused its substantive due process analysis on state regula-
tion of intimate relationships. 466 State economic regulation is widely
presumed legitimate when challenged on due process grounds, while
regulations violating racial discrimination principles or the First
Amendment are not automatically deemed valid.467 Yet there is no
justification that personal liberties are more deserving of protection
than economic rights. Quite the opposite, interests in business are fre-
quently independent. Therefore, they have no particular constitu-
tional source as often exists for personal liberties.468 Surely, many
individuals view economic rights as equally important to their lives as
personal liberties.
Ironically, President Roosevelt, largely responsible for eliminating
economic due process as a viable tool for the judiciary. 469 expressed
the importance of economic liberties.470  In addressing Congress,
Roosevelt voiced his belief that freedom is not complete without "ec-
onomic security and independence. '471 In addition, he recognized the
"right of every business man, large and small, to trade in an atmos-
463. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
464. See BORK, supra note 36. at 44.
465. See ELY, supra note 51. at 15 (noting that substantive due process analysis is still preva-
lent in personal liberties jurisprudence).
466. See Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a state provision limiting
physician's ability to give contraception information to married couples violates the Due Process
Clause).
467. See John Hetherington. State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law.
53 Nw. U. L. REV. 13, 31 (1958).
468. Id.
469. See BORK. supra note 36. at 54.
470. See CoRwIN, supra note 74, at 4 (noting President Roosevelt's attempts to include
greater economic liberties in a second Bill of Rights. which proved unsuccessful).
471. Id. (quoting President Roosevelt. who said: -Necessitous men are not free men.").
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phere of freedom .... ,,472 Viewing these statements in isolation, one
would indeed be led to believe that Roosevelt was a great supporter
of economic freedom. Nevertheless, when viewed in the context of
the Great Depression and the developing New Deal framework, it is
apparent that the emphasis necessarily rested on economic security.473
One famous scholar has opined that this period resulted in the most
changes to constitutional interpretation in our country. 474 The result
was a radical transformation of the government's role in economic ar-
eas.475 The new framework included the belief that it was the govern-
ment's responsibility to assist people who could not help
themselves. 476 In order to execute this framework, the Court had to
recognize that economic liberties are sometimes violated by authori-
ties outside of government, and legislation may be required to cure
this. 477 Obviously, the Court's near per se invalidation of economic
regulations could not stand in light of this. 478 The question should be
whether it was necessary to cause such a complete reversal of Lochner
and its progeny while still allowing vitality to remain in substantive
due process outside the economic realm.
Opponents of substantive due process often cite judicial review as
its main downfall. 479 The problem some scholars have with judicial
review is that the Court strikes legislative acts and essentially replaces
legislative judgment with its own views, which is difficult to rectify.480
Therefore, the Court substitutes its judgments and values for that of
the peoples' elected representatives, and thus harms the effectiveness
of our representative democracy.481 In contrast, the Fourteenth
Amendment is ambiguous and seems to require an insertion of sub-
stance to interpret its provisions. 482 Further muddying the judicial
task is the fact that few records of the Fourteenth Amendment de-
bates still exist. 483 Therefore, the judiciary was left with only the
472. Id. at 5.
473. Id. at 158.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. See CORWIN. supra note 74, at 158.
477. Id. at 161.
478. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
479. See ELY. supra note 51, at 4: BORK. supra note 36, at 16.
480. See ELY, supra note 51. at 4.
481. Id. at 5.
482. Id. at 14.
483. Id. at 17 (citing Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112. 195 (1970)) (discussing the problems
with construing the Fourteenth Amendment).
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adopted language as evidence of what the Due Process Clause was
intended to protect.48 4
As established above, Lochner has been in disrepute for decades.
Therefore, substantive due process in the economic realm has been a
virtual nonentity, requiring only mere rationality of government ac-
tion to validate it.485 How, then, is the Court to uphold the Constitu-
tion for the protection of economic liberties? Even the most stringent
opponents of substantive due process must realize that the Court
needs to evolve to uphold society's principles. One scholar has sug-
gested that the Court's constitutional objective is to define values and
state principles. 486 Why, then, are the economic values imposed in the
Lochner era heavily criticized? Is it simply because values changed,
rather than that the Court's actual approach was evil? If it is wrong to
let the values of a past generation control us today,487 then the role of
economic liberties should be reevaluated in today's marketplace, one
much different than that of the New Deal Era.
The Court has simply moved from the extreme of near per se invali-
dation of economic regulation to the opposite extreme of near per se
validation. 488 If one extreme has been characterized as evil and inap-
propriate, it seems senseless that the complete opposite view would
not be equally so. Especially where, as here, a provision's language is
ambiguous and its directives unclear, a more moderate approach
seems most appropriate. Certainly, some value lies in economic due
process, or state courts would not continue to apply it.489 Therefore, it
is necessary to reexamine substantive due process and its values
within a moderate framework.
2. The Possibility of Moderate Lochnerism
Despite the many adamant opponents of economic due process, this
judicial concept is not wholly criticized. Some scholars have noted, as
this Comment suggests, that the Supreme Court has been overzealous
484. Id.
485. Id. at 20.
486. BICKEL, supra note 375, at 55.
487. See ELY. supra note 51, at II (quoting President Jefferson "that the earth belongs in
usufruct to the living: that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it").
488. See Hetherington, supra note 467. at 32 (noting that the Court's past view that the pro-
duction and sale of items should not be prohibited has been replaced by the view that even
legitimate occupations may be constrained).
489. See Note. State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88 YALE L.J.
1487 (1979) [hereinafter A Proposed Approach] (stating that despite federal courts' abandon-
ment of substantive due process in the economic realm. state courts continuously use the
analysis).
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in eliminating economic due process. 490 Alternative methods exist for
the application of moderate substantive due process to economic
regulations.
a. The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle
The less-restrictive-alternative principle simply means what its
name suggests. When a less restrictive alternative to an imposed eco-
nomic regulation exists, this is evidence of the invalidity of the regula-
tion. 491 Therefore, due process is violated if the legislature can reach
its proposed ends equally as well through more limited regulations. 492
The Court used to rely on an economic less-restrictive-alternative ap-
proach, but stopped utilizing this approach in Olsen v. Nebraska.493
Dissenters of this approach object to its use based on the adminis-
trative burden of enforcing regulations, its ambiguity, and its incom-
pleteness.494 However, the administrative burden appears slight and
does not outweigh the advantages of legislatures carefully thinking
about the necessity of the challenged regulation. 495 The danger of am-
biguity in applying the principle exists, but many areas of law require
careful consideration on an ad hoc basis. 496 Incompleteness issues in-
volve the belief that the principle should not be used if the result
would merely restrict some but allow others to continue similar prac-
tices. 497 This can be resolved through recognizing that people and the
economy are best served by having a greater number of options from
which to choose. 498
Admittedly, the danger of judicial value inferences still exists in this
approach. However, this should not bar its use, but rather spawn cer-
tain guidelines for its application.4 99 For example, one requirement of
the less-restrictive-alternative principle is that the alternative be
490. See Guy Miller Struve. The Less-Restrictive-Alternaive Principle and Economic Due Pro-
cess. 80 HARv. L. REV. 1463 (1967) (proposing a moderate application of economic due process
and criticizing the Court for its complete abandonment): A Proposed Approach. supra note 489
(discussing the remaining justifications for economic due process): Sunstein. supra note 25. at
883 (opining that in some ways, Lochner has never been overruled because its premises still exist
in modern constitutional law).
491. See Struve. supra note 490.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 1463 (citing Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States. 323 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941)).
494. Id. at 1465-66.
495. Id.
496. Id. 1466.
497. Struve. supra note 490, at 1466 (illustrating the incompleteness problem with the example
of doctors allowed to give tattoos while other professionals are precluded from doing so).
498. Id.
499. Id.
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equally as effective as the challenged regulation.50 Whether the legis-
lature considered alternatives, and its justifications for rejecting those
considerations should be determined. 5 11 If no legislative findings
about an alternative exist, this indicates that the legislature cannot
strongly conclude it is not equally as effective. Conversely, evidence
of careful consideration and reasons for rejecting an alternative
should weigh in favor of the resulting economic regulation. 50 2 For ex-
ample, despite the Court's ruling in Carolene Products Co. v. United
States,503 holding that a prohibition against shipment of filled milk did
not violate due process, many state courts have found labeling re-
quirements to be equally effective alternatives for the protection of
public health.50 4
In addition, limitations may be imposed on this approach in order
to guard against judicial displacement of the legislative role. Defer-
ence should be given to legislative decisions regarding quantitative or
technical issues. 50 5 In addition, complex economic regulations should
be given a stronger presumption of validity, as courts may not have
adequate resources to determine alternatives. 50 6 Furthermore, plac-
ing the burden of production on the state should only be done when
no apparent reason exists for why an alternative would not be valid,
because this implies that the legislature did not consider the
alternative. 507
Guy Miller Struve then turns to a comparison of the less-restrictive-
alternative principle to other principles of economic rights. In consid-
ering the Takings Clause, he suggests that the less-restrictive-alterna-
tive approach is preferable and that courts should consider it before
deciding whether a regulation constitutes a taking. 508 Justifications for
this are that an owner should not be required to relinquish property
and the public should not have to pay if it is unnecessary.50 9 In addi-
tion, the less-restrictive-alternative principle may be preferable to a
straight balancing of whether the interests harmed outweigh those
protected5 10 The former approach has a more neutral basis and does
500. Id. at 1467.
501. 1d.
502. Id. at 1468.
503. 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
504. See Struve, supra note 490. at 1467.
505. Id. at 1469.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1470.
509. Id. at 1486 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)) (applying the
less-restrictive-alternative approach to an economic regulation challenged as a taking).
510. See Struve, supra note 490. at 1471.
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not lead to a conclusion that specific economic issues are beyond the
government's regulatory power, as may occur with balancing.51'
b. The Use of Economic Theories
A second moderate approach recognizes the inherent dangers of
economic due process and attempts to reconcile these with its justify-
ing goals through the use of economic theories. 512 The overriding
danger of economic due process is that the judiciary will impose its
own values about what economic policy is and its beliefs about the
market's workings.513 In contrast, the justification of the concept lies
in the recognition that states sometimes have no "public interest justi-
fication" but are merely regulating in favor of one group to the detri-
ment of another.514 Therefore, a court's analysis of public interest is
necessary to determine when a regulation is really a result of private
interest legislation. 51 5 Under a state economic due process analysis, as
must be considered because of the lack of federal application, this
scholar concludes that no sound approach exists for avoiding these
dangers or reaching these objectives. 5 16 Rather, a more particular
ends analysis than the general public welfare requirement should be
used and health and safety justifications offered for impermissible
ends to be removed through a less drastic means analysis and a heavy
presumption of validity. 51 7
i. A more specific ends typology
Legislation is generally upheld under an economic due process anal-
ysis if it furthers a permissible police power end. 51 8 One of these is a
"general welfare" protection. The danger of judicial value imposition
is likely here because the vagueness of the term invites the judiciary to
impose its beliefs about what general welfare includes. 51 9 This prob-
lem can be resolved by using the allocation, stabilization, and redistri-
bution categories used by economists to define general welfare. 52°t
Allocation and stabilization are termed "efficiency measures" because
511. Id.
512. A Proposed Approach. supra note 489.
513. Id. at 1489.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 1490.
516. Id. at 1491-1500 (analyzing three categories of state economic due process methods and
concluding that they are inadequate).
517. Id. at 1501.
518. See A Proposed Approach, supra note 489. at 1492.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 1501.
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of their focus on advancing community welfare.52 1 Allocative mea-
sures repair market problems and stabilization increases employment
to ensure stable prices and economic growth. 522 As suggested by their
definitions, both categories are generally justifiable state ends and are
usually deemed permissible when challenged. 523 In contrast, the third
category encompasses actions that have a large potential to be imper-
missible. Redistributions focus on the transfer of wealth, such as wel-
fare payments.524 Redistributions from the rich to the poor, such as
aid for subsidized housing, supplemental correctional redistributions
to repair unintended legislative effects, and personal security redistri-
bution to assist those harmed by sources beyond their control, should
also generally be seen as permissible economic regulations.525 In con-
trast, economic redistributions that do not increase community wel-
fare, help a disadvantaged group or those harmed by "natural or
market forces," or promote public health or safety are generally im-
permissible because there is a strong possibility that the regulation is
actually private interest legislation. 526
Application of these specific categories strictly limits judicial value
impositions. In addition, this approach may be complimentary to tak-
ings analyses because where an efficiency measure takes from one
group to achieve its legitimate end, an economic due process chal-
lenge will fail, but compensation may still be required under the Fifth
Amendment. 527
ii. Means approaches for solving impermissible health and safety
ends rationales
As explained above, a court's determination of a "public interest"
justification is crucial to identifying when the state is actually regulat-
ing for private interests. 528 Furthermore, economic due process re-
quires a judicial determination of whether the means used are
rationally related to achieving the purported ends.529 When a court
determines this relation without guidelines, it may inappropriately
base its conclusion on its own beliefs about the economy and once
521. Id. at 1502.
522. Id. at 1501 (citing D. HYMAN. THE ECONOMICS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY 5-6
(1973)).
523. Id. at 1502-03.
524. See A Proposed Approach. supra note 489. at 1503.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 1504.
528. Id. at 1489.
529. Id. at 1490.
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again impose its own values.5 30 Furthermore, requiring the state to
have strong proof that the means will achieve the ends is not ade-
quately deferential to the legislature.5 31
One scholar opines that three steps may correct these problems
with economic due process. First, the burden should be placed on the
state to identify its ends. 532 This seems sensible since the state is the
party most familiar with its own objectives. 533 Next, the court should
place the articulated end into one of the above categories of alloca-
tion, stabilization, or redistribution. Obviously, if the end is inappro-
priate, the inquiry will end there and the regulation justifiably may be
overturned.53 4 However, if the end is permissible, the court should
apply the less-restrictive-alternative principle to determine whether
the state's objective could have been reached in an equally effective
but less burdensome way. 535 Finally, a low burden should be placed
on the state to articulate the means/ends relationship because eco-
nomic policies often change and the legislature must be given flexibil-
ity to regulate along with these changes. 536 In other words, the
legislature's identified connection between the means and ends should
meet with a heavy presumption of validity. This approach may mini-
mize the dangers of judicial value imposition, allow protection of eco-
nomic liberties, and aid the legislature in reexamining its goals and
processes used to achieve them. 537
3. Craigmiles v. Giles and the Attempt to Moderately Revive
Economic Due Process
As previously discussed, there is little justification for eliminating
the use of substantive due process for challenges to economic regula-
tions while retaining its use in areas concerning personal liberties. 538
If anything, it seems apparent that the dangers of judicial value impo-
sitions are stronger when the interests at stake are an individual's
rights to do what they desire with their bodies, such as in right to die
and abortion cases. Although the Privileges or Immunities Clause
may be a more appropriate place to base protection of economic liber-
ties, it is not a completely viable option yet and thus raises more litiga-
530. See A Proposed Approach, supra note 489. at 1495.
531. Id. at 1497.
532. Id. at 1505.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 1506.
535. Id.: Struve. supra note 490.
536. See A Proposed Approach. supra note 489. at 1508.
537. Id. at 1509.
538. See Ety. supra note 51.
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tion uncertainties than a limited substantive due process approach
would. Both the district and appellate court in Craigmiles v. Giles539
attempted to apply a moderate substantive due process analysis in
striking the FDEA.540 However, no specific technique was used to
achieve moderation. Therefore, the decisions may have had stronger
legitimate bases had they used one of the above approaches.
In striking the FDEA, the Craigmiles district court held that the
state's means of requiring licensure as a funeral director for the sale of
caskets was not rationally related to the advanced state ends of pro-
tecting funeral consumers and protecting the "health, safety and wel-
fare of the public. ' 541 The Craigmiles court was obviously doubtful of
the relationship between the FDEA and the state's purported ends
and hinted that the interest may have been impermissibly private
rather than public. 542 The court found no support for the state's pub-
lic health protection argument because the state offered no evidence
of any harm caused by faulty caskets. 543 Furthermore, the court relied
on the general economic theory that competition is preferable because
consumers are better served, rather than disadvantaged, when they
have more options for places to buy a casket. 544 The problem with
this opinion, and its various cites to Lochner era authority, is that it
may not be viewed as moderate enough to legitimize it.545 While ap-
plauding the court's protection of the plaintiffs' liberty interests in
their chosen occupations, this Comment finds that use of the above
moderate frameworks would lend the decision more credibility and
steer it away from Lochnerizing.
The court summarily concluded that the protection of consumers,
health, safety, and welfare were permissible state ends. 546 Although
these ends superficially appear permissible, a deeper analysis would
have been helpful. This is especially true because one of the advanced
ends was the ambiguous public welfare justification. In using the eco-
nomic categorization approach described above, 547 the purported end
does not seem to fit into either efficiency measure. Protecting the
public health and safety against the sale of a product designed to hold
539. 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24637 (6th Cir. 2002).
540. Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act. TENN. CouE ANN. §§ 62-5-101 -62-5-611 (1997).
541. Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
542. Id. at 622-24.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 661-62 (citing Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 (1933): Meyer v. Nebraska. 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas. 236 U.S. 1 (1914): Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45
(1905)).
546. Id.
547. See A Proposed Approach. supra note 489, at 1502.
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human remains neither increases net community welfare, helps a dis-
advantaged group, aids those injured by market or natural resources,
nor increases public health and safety.548
Therefore, the possibility increases that the FDEA is an inappropri-
ate redistributive measure intended to increase the wealth of licensed
funeral directors by allowing them a monopoly in the sale of caskets,
while harming equally qualified salespeople by restricting their occu-
pational choices. The FDEA imposes large costs on business people
through its requirement of attending a faraway school for a substantial
amount of time and money while returning an almost nonexistent
health gain. 549 By categorizing the end in terms of economic mea-
sures, the court could avoid criticisms of value imposition by basing its
decision on its own judgment that public welfare does not require the
FDEA for its protection.
After establishing the end categorization, the court should have
next considered whether less restrictive alternatives to the FDEA ex-
isted in determining whether a rational relationship existed between
the licensure requirement and public health and welfare. 550 The state
advanced its end of consumer protection by proposing that funeral
directors are better equipped to deal with the grievous circumstances
the sale is made under, inform customers of their casket needs, and
provide warranty information. 551 However, the legislature could have
protected these interests, doubtful as they are, by simply requiring
that all casket retailers, whether a funeral director or independent
salesperson, provide consumers with information. 552 Thus, this would
be much less restrictive than requiring expensive training unrelated to
these issues.553
The second state justification offered was public health and safety.
If the state were truly concerned about safety in using caskets for bur-
ial, it would regulate the construction of caskets or require protective
sealants. 554 This would be more effective in achieving safety interests
and less burdensome on potential individual salespersons. That the
state offered no evidence of alternatives considered or showed why
548. Id.
549. Craigmiles. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
550. See Struve. supra note 490. at 1463.
551. Craigriles. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 663-64.
552. Id. at 663 (opining that no retailers need to be required to provide prices, because if they
do not. they will fail in business of their own accord). The above opinion illustrates the judiciary
using its own theories about how the economy works.
553. Id. (noting that the required training has nothing to do with public health and safety).
554. Id. at 662 (stating that evidence shows the state itself must not really believe that caskets
are important to safety).
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alternatives would be less effective in achieving the state's goals indi-
cates a tenuous means/ends connection. 5 5
Although the above analysis was undertaken before the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed Craigmiles, the court seemed to rely on much of this
reasoning. Despite noting that rational basis review "does not require
the best or most finely honed legislation to be passed," the court used
what appears to be a less-restrictive-alternative analyis.55 6 Rather
than require casket retailers to obtain licenses as required by the
FDEA, the court noted that the legislature could prevent misrepre-
sentation by making FDEA provisions applicable to retailers without
a license.5 5 7 This would serve the state's purported end of protecting
consumers against fraud while protecting casket retailers' economic
rights. The Craigmiles court also noted that the Supreme Court is
often suspicious when legislatures use an indirect path to reach ends
that could be reached directly through "better-tailored regula-
tions." 558
However, in a possible attempt to defeat potential cries of Lochner-
ism, the court explicitly states that it is "not imposing our view of a
well-functioning market" and reasons that "no sophisticated economic
analysis is required" to reach its conclusion.5 59 Despite these procla-
mations, the court did conclude that the FDEA licensure requirement
blocks competition and that less competition actually harms consum-
ers because prices are raised and lower quality caskets are availa-
ble.5 60 Although the premise that competition drives down prices is
hardly complex or controversial, the court may have legitimized its
decision by classifying the ends as redistributive due to the monopolis-
tic effect of the FDEA.
Although Craigmiles is an extremely cautious step toward increased
protection of economic liberties, and despite the Sixth Circuit's vehe-
ment rejection of Lochnerism, the opinions are a rare victory for eco-
nomic due process. However, it is unlikely that such results will
become common or that the level of scrutiny for economic regulation
will be raised in the near future. Therefore, the doctrine continues to
rest on perilous grounds and one last area of economic redress must
be considered.
555. See Struve, supra note 490, at 1468.
556. Craigmiles, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24637 at 17.
557. lM.
558. Id. at 18 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
559. Id. at 24.
560. Id. at 9.
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C. The Viability of the Takings Clause for the Protection of
Economic Rights
Justice Holmes forecasted the present condition of economic liber-
ties in 1927, particularly the availability of only takings as an area for
redress, when he opined that legislation may limit any business it
wishes, as long as compensation is made when due. 561 The present
tripartite problem is that insubstantial compensation is being given for
takings, the Court still holds substantive due process in disrepute, and
the revival of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is uncertain at this
point. Therefore, little protection against economic regulation is
available. The interrelationship between the three clauses is impor-
tant because the demise of one often reflects the weight jurisprudence
places on another. As illustrated, the early eradication of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause led to the Court's development of the
highly subjective substantive due process rationale. 562 Similarly, the
Takings Clause has been subject to a historically contradictory analysis
and application. 563 Yet strong takings jurisprudence is necessary both
because it is the strongest area from which individuals may receive
redress for governmental economic infringements and because of its
complementary character to substantive due process.564 The nexus
between liberty, protected by the Due Process Clause, and property,
protected by the Takings Clause, was evident early in our country's
legal system. A quote by Madison in 1792 is illustrative:
In its larger and juster meaning, it [property] embraces every thing
[sic] to which a man may attach a value and a right .... He has
property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person ....
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free
choice of the objects on which to employ them. 5 65
561. See Tyson & Bros. v. Banton. 273 U.S. 418. 446 (1927) (Holmes, J.. dissenting) (dissenting
from the Court's substantive due process finding that restraint of a business was
unconstitutional).
562. See Saenz v. Roe. 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas. J.. dissenting) (stating that he is
open to reconsidering the proper role of privileges or immunities because of the disarray its
abandonment has caused in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, namely the Due Process
Clause).
563. See CLEGG ET AL.. supra note 129, at 3 (noting that takings analyses are a special chal-
lenge to adjudicate because other economic protections have been eliminated, thereby placing
increased weight on the Takings Clause).
564. See A Proposed Approach, supra note 489. at 1504 (noting the complementary nature
between takings and substantive due process, because the former claim may succeed although
the latter has failed, due to a statute's permissibility as an efficiency measure). See also Sunstein.
supra note 25. at 886 (opining that analyses similar to those of the Lochner era have not been
abandoned in the sense that they are still reflected in takings analyses).
565. See CLEGG ET AL.. supra note 129. at I (citing Property, 1792 NAT'L GAZEIrE 12: JAMES
MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 201 (Hobson et al. eds., 1979)).
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In the current information age, the definitions and protections of
property have become both more difficult and more crucial to the se-
curity of economic rights. Furthermore, while interest in the Takings
Clause is high, the area of law is in disarray. 566 Many scholars hold the
view that the takings doctrine is highly in need of repair.567
1. The Present Regulatory Takings Analysis
A straightforward reading of the Fifth Amendment language im-
plies a broad construction of private property and just compensa-
tion. 568 Furthermore, limitations on the clause's applicability to only
takings for public use seems justified. 569 The original proposed text
was narrower while the language actually adopted was more expan-
sive and straightforward. 570 Therefore, while the records of the Tak-
ings Clause enactment are brief, it seems a broader interpretation is
more accurate.5 71 Furthermore, the Court has held that the just com-
pensation component requires the government to compensate the
property owner with something holding actual value.5 72 In contrast,
Professor Richard A. Epstein has argued that uncompensated takings,
based on the state's police power to prevent or undo the property
owner's wrong, are legitimate. 573
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council574 establishes the balanc-
ing factors of a regulatory takings analysis. Although the Court has
stated that the inquiry should be ad hoc, three factors are generally
weighed and considered. 575 These factors are: (1) the character of the
governmental action; (2) its economic impact; and (3) the interference
with the plaintiffs' "reasonable, investment-backed expectations. 576
566. Id. at 3 (noting that the judiciary has only a "confusing array of ever varying precedent"
with which to determine the proper Takings jurisprudence).
567. See Robert K. Hur, Note. Takings, Trade Secrets and Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?. 53
STAN. L. REV. 447 (2000) (citing Jed Rubenfield, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993): BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONS-I1IUTION 8 (1977) (describing takings law as "a
chaos of confusing argument"): Andrea L. Peterson. The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989)
(opining that the clause is in "far worse shape than realized")).
568. See CLEGG ET AL.. supra 129, at 8.
569. Id. at 11.
570. Id. at 15.
571. Id. at 15-16.
572. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
573. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 59 (1985).
574. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
575. See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v New York City. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (establishing that a
regulatory takings analysis should be an ad hoc, factual inquiry).
576. Id. See also text accompanying note 150 (describing the three factors).
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Lucas also established that when a regulation removes all economic
value from property, a per se taking has occurred.577 Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto578 is the complex, but controlling authority for a regulatory
takings analysis applying the above three factors. 579 Monsanto in-
volved a challenge to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA) 58 0 requiring the disclosure of health, safety, and
environmental information during three independent statutory peri-
ods. The Court held the third factor, interference with the plaintiff's
reasonable, investment-backed expectation, to be dispositive in Mon-
santo for the 1978 FIFRA period. 58I During this statutory period, the
plaintiff knew of the disclosure requirement regarding its trade secrets
but submitted them anyway. 58 2 Therefore, the Court held that the
plaintiff had no reasonable expectation that the trade secrets it sub-
mitted would remain confidential. 58 3 However, because of the factual
complexities of this case, application of its holding to future cases is
often ambiguous, as is evident in the Phillip Morris III and Phillip
Morris IV decisions discussed below. 584
Under the reasonable, investment-backed expectation factor, one
scholar has noted that a "taking" is less protective of economic rights
than a "deprivation.1 58 5 This is because the word "taken" means that
one loses a right that is given to another.586 Therefore, a taking neces-
sarily implies that the owner had possession of the right before he lost
it. In contrast, a deprivation may consist of something never actually
had, such as the liberty to work at a chosen occupation. 587 Similarly,
an investment-backed expectation necessitates that a property owner
had such an expectation before the government can be held to have
interfered with it.588 However, this issue is also subject to different
analyses as to whether the time to evaluate the plaintiff's reasonable
expectation is when the property was acquired or when the challenged
577. Phillip Morris. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 AT 24 (citing Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1015).
578. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
579. See Phillip Morris III. 267 F.3d 45 (lst Cir. 2001) (citing Monsanto as controlling
authority).
580. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
581. Monsanto. 467 U.S. at 1005.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 1009.
584. Phillip Morris 11. 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding a different Monsanto statutory
period dispositive here than it did in its prior Phillip Morris II decision. 159 F.3d 670 (lst Cir.
1998)) rehearing en banc 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 (1st Cir. 2002).
585. See CL-EGO ET AL.. supra note 129, at 24.
586. Id. at 24.
587. Id. at 24.
588. See Monsanto. 467 U.S. at 1006-07.
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regulation was enacted. 589 In other words, must the owner have an
investment-backed expectation in the confidentiality of his or her
trade secret at the time of acquisition or when interfering regulation is
enacted? 5 90
In contrast to a substantive due process analysis, one scholar has
noted that the strength of the government's justification for regulation
should not be considered regarding the character of the government
action.591 This is because the government must compensate regardless
of the strength of a public interest justification, unless the property is
illegal. 592 As will be examined, this is particularly relevant to analyz-
ing the withdrawn Phillip Morris III decision, as it seems the court was
balancing the need for public protection from cigarettes against the
manufacturers' interest in their trade secrets.5 93
2. Criticisms and Proposals for Takings Analysis
One scholar has argued that takings analyses have completely
moved away from reliance on the text of the Fifth Amendment and
have essentially become ad hoc balancing tests. 594 He argues that this
result is erroneous because the broad text of the clause illustrates the
broad protections it was meant to effect. 595 To sustain the clause as a
rule and ensure the protections it intended, rather than create a "mask
for judicial predilections," he argues that courts should consider the
three factors successively rather than grouped together. 596 Further-
more, the scholar argues that just compensation refers to complete
compensation. 597 It would appear that the Court agreed with him on
this point, holding in Monsanto that the compensation be of "real
value. '598 However, as we will see, lower courts have split when ap-
589. See Phillip Morris III, No. 00-2425. No. 00-2449, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22348. at *38-40
(1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (considering the plaintiff's expectation at the time when the challenged
regulation was enacted). But see Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC. 62 F.3d 449 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that the relevant time to determine the plaintiff's expectation to be when the
property was acquired).
590. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Blackmun, J.. dissenting) (opin-
ing that personal property owners should be aware that new regulation may devalue their prop-
erty because states commonly regulate commercial dealings).
591. See CLEGC, ET AL.., supra note 129. at 37. Compare the substantive due process applied in
Craigmiles. where the legitimacy and strength of the government's end is a large part of the
analysis.
592. Id. at 32-37.
593. See Phillip Morris 1, 267 F.3d at 61 (Selya. J.. dissenting).
594. See CLEGG ET AL.. supra note 129, at 7.
595. Id. at 8.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 10.
598. Monsanto. 467 U.S. at 1003.
[Vol. 52:675
THE RETURN TO LOCHNERISM?
plying this directive. 599 Therefore, it is important to consider alterna-
tive views of takings analyses.
a. Spillover Theory
Scholars have argued that economic considerations surrounding
regulatory takings should be the Court's guidepost.600 Specifically,
one scholar proposes that externalities should be dispositive to the
Court's analysis. Externalities involve considerations of the spillover
effects that occur when a property owner does not examine how his
actions impact others. 60 1 In his view, regulatory takings should not be
allowed unless substantial spillover effects are present. Therefore,
when an externality impacts a large portion of the public, a taking
could be justified on public use grounds.60 2
To illustrate his point, the scholar uses the helpful hypothetical of a
coal-burning factory. In this example, air pollution is the spillover ef-
fect. The smoke resulting from burning coal impacts public health. If
the factory owner does not consider this external cost, his production
costs appear lower than they actually are. Therefore, the owner gains
the advantage of increased output, while the public bears the higher
cost of pollution.60 3 The analysis of the taking should not hinge on the
health of the public but on the undetermined cost against the advan-
tages the factory gives the public.60 4 This focus comports with the
government's objective to ensure that the burden of externalities are
placed on the public only when the return is justifiable. 605 In addition,
another scholar argues that when a substantial spillover exists, the
property owner is entitled to no compensation for the regulatory tak-
ing, regardless of the damage to the property. 60 6 However, examina-
tion and determination of what constitutes a significant spillover may
lead to judges imposing their own values. In addition, the government
is subject to political pressures that may cause it to disregard the pub-
lic's interest. 6°7
599. See infra notes 655-671 and accompanying text.
600. See CLEO; ET AL.. supra note 129. at 69.
601. Id. at 70.
602. Id.
603. Id. at 71.
604. Id. at 71-72.
605. Id. at 72.
606. See Berger. supra note 158, at 179.
607. See CLEGG ET AL.. supra note 129. at 72.
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b. A Policy Theory
Another scholar has argued that an unexpected government regula-
tion is not fair when it results in the loss of property without compen-
sating such a loss. 60 8 This view seems to comport with the investment-
backed expectation factor the Court has since developed. However,
the scholar focuses more on the policies of fairness and efficiency rele-
vant to a takings jurisprudence. 60 9 Considerations of the noxious use
theory are relevant to fairness determinations. This approach rests on
finding a government regulation just when the use of property is
"wrongful, harmful or prejudicial to the health, safety or morals of the
public. ' 610 Of course, this approach involves numerous value deter-
minations that may undermine the legitimacy of decisions based on it
where the use is less than egregious.
A second part of the policy consideration involves the distinction
between the "enterprise or arbitral nature" of the government's ac-
tion. 611 The regulation may be enterprising when the government is
taking economic resources to fulfill its continuous function in a partic-
ular area, such as education. 612 In contrast, an arbitral regulation in-
volves the government distinguishing between competing economic
parties.613 One scholar argues that when government action in this
area causes property value to fall, no compensation is owed.614 Diffi-
culties with this distinction lie in deciding when one part of the public
should prosper from regulation that harms another part of the pub-
lic. 6 15 Hence, developing governing rules would be difficult here.
A third policy approach to takings is found in welfare economics. 616
This theory is based on a utilitarian objective of increasing the "great-
est good to the greatest number" of people and determining when
compensation should be enforced to further that goal.617 This theory
next considers when not compensating a party is fair. Social contexts
should not be the decisive factor here. Rather, ensuring equal liberty
608. See Berger, supra note 158, at 169.
609. Id. at 167 (opining that a takings decision is unjust if it goes against a community's notion
of fairness).
610. Id. at 172.
611. Id. at 177.
612. Id. at 178.
613. Id.
614. See Berger, supra note 158. at 178 (citing Joseph L. Sax. Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964)).
615. Id. at 178.
616. Id. (citing Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law. 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)).
617. Id. at 182.
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between parties should be the objective. 618 However, the parties may
justifiably be treated unequally under certain circumstances. 61 9
Berger concludes that the best policy is a "first-in-time approach"
for compensation, which protects investments against future harms.620
Government regulation often impacts property interests, yet is often
not foreseeable. Therefore, the important issue is compensation. 62 1
In his view, this approach complies with both fairness and efficiency
considerations. 622 Principles of fairness include the premise that par-
ties know about facts that affect a property's value at the time they
acquire it.623 In addition, people often consider events that may alter
the property's value. 624 Furthermore, this approach encourages eco-
nomic efficiency by providing an incentive to the government to bal-
ance costs and benefits of regulation before enactment.625 A first-in-
time compensation rule would also deter the property owner from de-
veloping his property in a contradictory way to introduced legislation,
because he would receive no compensation. 626
c. "Implicit-In-Kind" Compensation
This takings approach is particularly relevant to the Phillip Morris
decisions. Implicit-in-kind compensation reflects awareness that a
government action that imposes costs on a property owner may also
have implicit advantages. 627 The Court recognized the validity of this
type of compensation in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,628 discuss-
ing that some government actions do not require external compensa-
tion because they carry a reciprocal benefit. However, there is no
justification for implicit-in-kind compensation where the government
regulation does not offer substantial advantages along with its costs. 629
Scholars citing this approach have relied on the Phillip Morris II deci-
sion for the proposition that the benefit of continued business in an
area is not sufficient compensation for taking trade secrets. 630
Whether the implicit-in-kind compensation is sufficient depends on
618. Id. at 183.
619. Id. at 184.
620. See Berger, supra note 158, at 193.
621. Id. at 166.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 195.
624. Id.
625. Id. at 197.
626. See Berger, supra note 158, at 198.
627. See EPSTEIN. supra note 573. at 195.
628. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
629. See Lawson & Seidman. supra note 449. at 1100.
630. Id, (citing Phillip Morris 11. 159 F.3d at 674-78).
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whether the expected benefits will be equal to or surpass the resulting
costs. 631 If the burdens imposed by the regulation are much larger
than the benefits, there is no basis for justifying implicit-in-kind
compensation. 632
Scholars have determined three general areas where an implicit-in-
kind compensation justification will fail.633 The first situation arises
when the party the government is imposing the regulation on can rea-
sonably expect to bear the burden more often than not.634 The second
circumstance results when the scope of the regulation is large and
complex, thereby causing large compliance costs, without equal ad-
vantages.635 Finally, implicit-in-kind compensation will fail when reg-
ulation carries additional costs besides those of compliance. 636 The
scholars note trade secrets as illustrative of this category, stating that
they often carry high costs relating to disclosure.637 The value of the
trade secret is diminished by producing such and this decrease in
property value will extend to areas outside the actual secret. 638 The
scholars conclude that more takings cases should be analyzed under
implicit-in-kind compensation. 639
d. Legislative Window-Breaking?
A fourth takings analysis in the specific realm of trade secrets and
the Phillip Morris decisions concludes that the real issue is how courts
will deal with legislation like 307B, which scholar Robert K. Hur pro-
poses is "malicious mischief directed against private industry. '640
However, the analysis is cut short by the conclusion that government
action like 307B is rare and similar legislation is not likely to follow
because of the judicial reaction to it.641 This conclusion was largely
based on the First Circuit's Phillip Morris H decision, upholding the
district court grant of preliminary injunction against 307B.642 The pro-
position that similar legislation requiring public disclosure of trade
631. Id at 1099.
632. Id. at 1100.
633. Id. at 1108.
634. Id,
635. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 449, at 1110.
636. Id. at 1111. For example, forcing Phillip Morris to produce trade secrets of tobacco in-
gredients will cause disclosure costs and lower the value of the products containing the secrets
because of the competitors' access to them.
637. Id.
638. Id.
639. Id. at 1112.
640. See Hur, supra note 567, at 451.
641. Id. at 451.
642. Phillip Morris II, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998).
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secrets will not follow because of negative judicial reaction to it is un-
dermined by the First Circuit's subsequent reversal of the permanent
injunction. 643 However, this premise may hold true after withdrawal
of that opinion and affirmation of the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in Phillip Morris IV.644 The characterization of 307B
as "legislative window-breaking," or vandalism of private industry, is
important because it raises questions concerning the strength of pro-
tection the Court will afford trade secrets in light of such regulation,
or whether they will reevaluate the strength of protection offered at
all.
6 4 5
As it stands, the takings jurisprudence offers little protection in the
respect that the government can simply pay to take as it desires. 646
This concept seems contrary to the Takings Clause's goal to protect
certain parties from bearing the burden of correcting public issues that
are not their responsibility.647 The protection becomes even weaker
when the compensation given is not sufficient.64 One scholar has
opined that a takings outcome rests on the deciding court simply
choosing between economic analysis or police power justifications.649
These distinct rationales have developed from contradictory case law
either protecting the state's police power, as in Mugler v. Kansas,650 or
reviewing economic impact to determine whether a taking has oc-
curred, as in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.651 The conflict be-
tween the competing rationales has never been explicitly resolved,
thereby rendering those whose economic rights have been harmed un-
certain about how to approach redress. 652 Where the litigation in-
volves strong arguments for both competing interests, the stakes are
higher and the outcome less certain. 65 3 For example, the First Circuit
643. Phillip Morris III1 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001). However, this case was inexplicably with-
drawn by court order approximately a month and a half after the opinion was published.
644. Phillip Morris IV. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403.
645. See Hur. supra note 567. at 450.
646. Id. at 454.
647. Id. at 453.
648. See Monsanto. 467 U.S. at 1009 (requiring that compensation bestow an actual benefit on
the property owner).
649. See Jed Rubenfield. Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1(89 (1993).
650. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that a prohibition law effecting a taking was valid under the
state's police power).
651. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that state regulation prohibiting coal mining to protect
streets and utility lines was an unjust taking).
652. See Hur. supra note 567. at 458.
653. Id. (discussing the tobacco industry's multi-billion dollar investment in its products and
thereby. its trade secrets, while the competing interest is the state's strong police power to pro-
tect public health against potentially dangerous ingredients included in the formulae).
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had an opportunity to address and resolve these inconsistencies at the
preliminary injunction stage of Phillip Morris, but did not.654
3. Phillip Morris III: Another Hurdle to Economic Rights?
There was little forewarning that the First Circuit would effect a
complete reversal from its Phillip Morris II decision. 655 Although
only ruling on the likelihood of the success on the merits for prelimi-
nary injunctive purposes, the court opined in Phillip Morris II that it
believed the government's argument would "bear no fruit" on re-
mand.656 Why, then, on review of the district court's grant of perma-
nent injunction, did the court decide that 307B was a valid exercise of
police power and not a taking? 657
Of the above approaches to takings problems, it appears that the
Phillip Morris II court relied in part on a noxious use approach in
justifying the state's police power and on an implicit-in-kind compen-
sation in justifying what it had before held was insubstantial compen-
sation. 658 The Disclosure Act is premised on the state's asserted belief
that public disclosure of the ingredients could result in a reduction of
health risks associated with tobacco products.659 Massachusetts ar-
gued its right to Mugler police power by stating that property owners
may not use their property to the public's detriment.6611 While the
court did not lend weight to that argument in Phillip Morris II,661 its
reliance on it in Phillip Morris III was clear. The court even cited
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy662 for the proposition that manu-
facturers' rights to secrecy are subject to states' police power rights.663
654. Id. at 471.
655. This case was originally meant to be illustrative of the trend toward increased protection
of economic liberties in the takings area as well as privileges or immunities and substantive due
process. However, the First Circuit completely departed from their Phillip Morris I1 reasoning
in this decision. Similarly. Robert Hur. in his analysis of the decision in 1999. noted the likeli-
hood of appeal. but seemed to summarily dismiss the possibility of government success. In yet
another turn of events, the First Circuit has withdrawn the opinion. The subsequent opinion
issued again raises hope that economic rights will be more adequately protected under the Tak-
ings Clause.
656. Phillip Morris 11. 159 F.3d at 678.
657. See generally Phillip Morris Ill. 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
658. Phillip Morris 11. 159 F.3d. at 676 (noting that the continued benefit of doing business in
Massachussetts did not constitute compensation).
659. See Hur. supra note 567, at 466 (citing Phillip Morris II. 159 F.3d at 675).
660. Id.
661. Id. (opining that the state's police power argument to protect public health was not likely
to be successful on the merits).
662. 249 U.S. 427 (1919) (upholding a statute requiring a manufacturer to disclose informa-
tion. despite its trade secret status).
663. But see Phillip Morris Il1. 267 F.3d at 81 (Selya. J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
use of this outdated case for modern takings analysis).
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In holding that Massachusetts had a rational concern about the dan-
gers of tobacco additives, the court relied on the right to regulate
when a noxious use of property is at issue.
As noted, the most startling break with its prior decision was the
court's reliance on what appears to be a form of implicit-in-kind com-
pensation. In Phillip Morris 11,664 the court rejected the state's argu-
ment that enactment of 307B removed any reasonable, investment-
backed expectation in confidentiality. In doing so, the court noted
that Massachusetts could not rely on Monsanto because compensation
there is dependent on a voluntary exchange. 665 The court stressed the
Supreme Court's recent decisions indicating its concern with the tak-
ings area and directing that it will demand substantial rather than
nominal compensations to legitimize government takings.666 In stark
contrast, the court in Phillip Morris III held that permission to con-
tinue conducting business in Massachusetts was a real benefit in ex-
change for disclosure of the manufacturers' trade secrets. 667 Surely
this is the type of nominal compensation that Phillip Morris I noted
the Supreme Court looks upon unfavorably. However, even if this
were considered sufficient compensation, which is highly doubtful, it
does not achieve the spirit of implicit-in-kind compensation. There is
simply no sound argument that 307B offers substantial net benefits in
exchange for disclosure, merely by allowing the manufacturers to con-
tinue in an already established business venture. 668 Rather, 307B im-
poses costs beyond those incident to disclosure by decreasing the
value of the trade secrets. As noted, when this results, implicit-in-kind
compensation does not exist. 669
In paying great deference to the state's purported police power and
requiring only de minimis compensation for the resulting taking, the
state ignored the tobacco manufacturers' economic rights in their
property. This comports with neither the goal, nor the text of the Tak-
ings Clause. Rather, the Phillip Morris III majority seemed to rely on
its own values and, as the dissent noted, "sacrifice[d] a bedrock princi-
ple of individual property rights" in order to respond to the public
health problem of smoking. 6711 If the First Circuit's fourth Phillip
664. 159 F.3d at 676.
665. Id. at 677.
666. Id.
667. See generally Phillip Morris III. 267 F.3d 45.
668. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 449. at 1100.
669. Id. at 1111 (noting that the decreased value of trade secrets incident to disclosure also
lowers the value of the underlying product. which would be cigarettes in this instance).
670. Phillip Morris /I1. 267 F.3d at 58 (Selya. J.. dissenting) (opining that the majority's judi-
cial exception to takings is bad law).
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Morris opinion holds 307B constitutionally valid, the dangers of such
increased "legislative window-breaking" will become much more
prevalent and the economic impacts may be staggering. Increasing
the police power drastically, while limiting the compensation required,
would be devastating to individuals seeking to protect their economic
liberties under the Takings Clause, as this is one of the few remaining
areas of redress. 671
4. Phillip Morris IV: Is a Uniform Regulatory Takings Rationale
Attainable?
Fortunately, the First Circuit reverted to an analysis more closely
resembing Phillip Morris H in its Phillip Morris IV decision. After en
banc review, the court determined that 307B did violate the Takings
Clause and therefore affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. 672 Although the result was the same as Phillip Morris II,
the analysis differed, thereby raising questions regarding the correct
regulatory takings rationale under Monsanto. In Phillip Morris II, the
court held the plaintiffs' reasonable, investment-backed expectation
dispositive and the second Monsanto period most analogous to the
present case. 673 In contrast, in Phillip Morris IV, the court held that
the character of government action was dispositive and that the sec-
ond Monsanto time period was relevant but not controlling. 674 In ad-
dition, Phillip Morris IV indirectly rejected the premise Phillip Morris
III accepted that an implicit-in-kind compensation had been made
through its holding that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally condi-
tion the plaintiffs' right to just compensation on the nominal benefit of
the right to sell tobacco.675
The concurring opinion in Phillip Morris IV highlights the conflict
over which factor should control. Perhaps in an attempt to simplify
the complex Monsanto analysis, the concurrence opines that the plain-
tiffs' reasonable, investment-backed expectation determines the out-
come of a trade secret taking.676 Under this analysis, Monsanto
established a per se rule that if the government takes a trade secret in
which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of secrecy and offers
no just compensation, then the Takings Clause has been violated.677
Therefore, the economic impact and character of regulation need not
671. See CLEGG ET AL., supra note 129, at 3.
672. Phillip Morris IV, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403.
673. Phillip Morris 11, 159 F.3d at 676-77.
674. Phillip Morris IV. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24403 at *37, *56.
675. Id. at 57-61.
676. Id. at 64.
677. Id. at 65-66.
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be considered. The complexity of Monsanto and opposing viewpoints
discussed above establish the need for clarity in reviewing regulatory
takings to more adequately protect economic rights. Specifically, the
Supreme Court must clearly address what constitutes a valuable bene-
fit to rise to the level of compensation, and whether Monsanto estab-
lished a per se rule where plaintiffs have reasonable, investment-
backed expectations of confidentiality.
IV. IMPACT
In light of the recent Saenz decision, it is more possible than it has
been in over a century that weight will be restored to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. This would be a positive effect because of the ex-
emplified disarray in Due Process Clause jurisprudence due to that
clause shouldering the burden of the nullified Privileges or Immunities
Clause for years.
However, it is unlikely that the entire burden of protecting eco-
nomic rights will be placed on the newly revived clause. The Court
must first completely reverse the enduring taint of the Slaughter-
House decision. 678 Although speculative, the Court has implicitly ex-
pressed a willingness to do this. By taking the first large step in Saenz,
the 7-2 majority has restored to the clause the most weight it has en-
joyed since its inception. In addition, the fact that even the dissent
explicitly expressed a desire to reconsider the role of privileges or im-
munities in the proper case is highly probative of that possibility.
Justice Thomas, although dissenting in Saenz, reiterated his interest
in reconsidering the role of privileges or immunities while concurring
in Troxel v. Granville.679 In this case, the Court affirmed a state su-
preme court reversal of an order granting visitation to grandpar-
ents. 680 The Court reasoned that the order's reversal was proper
because it interfered with the parents' fundamental rights to raise
their children in the manner desired.681 Therefore, while it does not
provide much hope from a privileges or immunities standpoint, it does
shed light on the revival of substantive due process although applied
in a personal, rather than economic context. However, Justice
Thomas's cognizance of Saenz and the expectations of litigants waiting
for further direction is a small, but positive, step. Referring to the
Saenz dissent, Justice Thomas stated, "This case also does not involve
a challenge based upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause and thus
678. See Winick, supra note 356.
679. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Thomas. J.. concurring).
680. Id. at 58.
681. Id. at 60.
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does not present an opportunity to reevaluate the meaning of that
Clause.1 68 2 This statement, at least slightly, illustrates that although
Saenz was a controversial decision, the Court, including the dissenters,
are not completely backing down from that revival of privileges or
immunities.
In contrast, a plaintiff who attempted to bring his claim upon
grounds the Court treated favorably in Saenz was unsuccessful. The
Court denied petition for rehearing after it denied writ in Obermeyer
v. Alaska Bar Ass'n.683 The Obermeyer plaintiff argued that the
Alaska Bar Association had abridged his privileges by arbitrarily lim-
iting the passage rate of those taking the Bar examination in order to
control access to the legal profession. 684 The notable aspect of plain-
tiff's argument was that he alleged a violation of his constitutional
right to travel because the bar association's rules limited applicants
from other states from practicing in Alaska if they have failed the
Alaska exam and imposed durational residency requirements. 685
Thus, he was attempting to apply the same key phrases to the facts of
his case that the Court found dispositive of an abridgment in Saenz. 686
While the plaintiff's attempts failed, this may be more attributable to
the strength of his argument than to the Court's unwillingness to rec-
ognize his privileges. 687
Restoring the Privileges or Immunities Clause could increase the
protection of economic liberties more than any action by the Court
since the Lochner era. However, the Court should proceed cautiously
by following a moderate fundamental rights understanding of original
intent. By doing so, it can avoid the highly subjective type of judicial
review which illegitimated substantive due process for so long.
As evidenced, the Saenz decision has piqued the interest of lower
courts seeking to protect economic rights on firmer ground than sub-
stantive due process can offer. However, in lieu of an explicit reversal
of Slaughter-House, district courts like Craigmiles must rely on the
tenuous economic due process doctrine in order to afford any protec-
tion to economic liberties. While the Craigmiles conclusion was cor-
682. Id. at 80.
683. 2000 Petition for Rehearing. Obermever v. Ala. Bar Ass'n. 532 U.S. 1048 (May 21, 2001)
(No. 00-1176) 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3828.
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. The key arguments that applied to Saenz do not fit appropriately within Obermeyer. For
example, the Oberrneyer plaintiff could feasibly live in Alaska despite not being able to practice
law there, while the Saenz plaintiff's right to settle was violated because she could not live in
California under the lower grant of financial aid regulated by the state.
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rect, its reasoning may be too reliant on Lochner value inferences to
be legitimate. The Court is still wary of economic due process. There-
fore, a better revival of substantive due process in the economic realm
would be to adopt the less-restrictive-alternative approach. Although
the Sixth Circuit denied relying on this principle on review, its state-
ments that Tennessee could serve its safety interests by making the
FDEA applicable to casket retailers rather than requiring licensure
appears to impose a requirement of narrowly tailored economic regu-
lation. This approach will check the Court's judicial review and en-
sure a moderate restoration of substantive due process in the
economic realm, rather than the all-encompassing role used in the
past.68 8 Furthermore, grounding the analysis in economic rather than
value judgments will be more politically correct and will lead to more
sound judgments. Past jurisprudence has proven that doctrines retain
limited capacity once cries of judicial value implementations are
made.
68 9
The Court's current stance on substantive due process treats per-
sonal and economic liberties unequally. The Court maintains its use
of substantive due process in the protection of personal liberties. As
mentioned, Troxel was ultimately decided on substantive due process
grounds.690 Similar to the district court in Craigmiles, the Court even
cited to Lochner era decisions to support parents' fundamental rights
to make decisions regarding their children. 691 However, both deci-
sions relied on were based on fundamental rights, not based on eco-
nomic rights. 692 Justice Thomas also noted in his concurrence that the
question of whether substantive due process and the "judicial enforce-
ment of unenumerated rights" was improper was an issue to decide
another time since neither party raised it.693 Justice Antonin Scalia
dissented and argued the impropriety of the Court citing to decisions
from a repudiated era for support. 694 The dissent's open reference to
Lochnerism and the plurality's staunch silence highlight the era's no-
torious largesse. If the Court is frowned upon for relying on even
688. See generally Coppage v. Kansas. 236 U.S. 1 (1915): Adair v. United States. 208 U.S. 161
(1908): Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905): Allgever v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
689. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (removing the powerful tool of substantive
due process in striking state economic regulation after three decades of near per se invalidation).
and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (forming the concept of substantive due process in
striking economic regulations).
690. Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
691. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923): Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
692. Id.
693. Id. at 80.
694. Id. at 92.
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personal rights decisions from the period, the possibility of economic
substantive due process will be minimal indeed.
One possibility is that the Court may reintroduce economic due
process principles in inadvertent ways. For example, the Court re-
cently held that the Due Process Clause substantively limits states'
discretion to impose punitive damages in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 695 The Court vacated and remanded the
case to the Ninth Circuit, which previously found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to lower a $4.5 million
punitive award. 696 Cooper was decided over the objection of the As-
sociation of Trial Lawyers of America, appearing as amicus curiae for
the respondent who received the award. 697 Petitioner argued that al-
lowing federal judges to rely on their own economic beliefs on sub-
stantive due process grounds "would be Lochnerism on a massive
scale." 698 Although vacating the Ninth Circuit decision, the Court ba-
sically allowed it discretion to determine whether the award was con-
stitutionally excessive, as petitioner feared. It is overwhelmingly
apparent that the Court is not going to outwardly embrace economic
due process, partly because of the fear of being labeled as Lochner-
izing. The stigma must be removed through continued judicial reli-
ance on the sound doctrines that may still be extracted from the
era.
6 9 9
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment provisions, the Fifth
Amendment is an important source for the protection of economic
liberties. The Court has illustrated its increased interest in takings in
recent years. Furthermore, because of the eradication of privileges or
immunities and economic due process, the Takings Clause has a large
burden-to fulfill protection of economic rights. Despite the comple-
mentary nature of substantive due process and regulatory takings
695. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
696. Id. at 428.
697. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America, Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (No. 99-2035).
698. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424 (2001) (No. 99-2035).
699. See generally Moran v. Clarke, No. 00-1015, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13293 (8th Cir. July 5.
2002) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant where the plaintiff claimed that his sub-
stantive due process rights were violated when the defendants' conspired to blame him for beat-
ing an inmate); Learner v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 544 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the right to
receive mental treatment is the kind of liberty interest substantive due process generally protects
in holding that prisoner's claim was proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1983): Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F.
Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that a regulation requiring casket sellers to have a
funeral directors license violated their liberty interest to work in their chosen occupation under a
substantive due process rationale).
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analyses, the Court has taken pains to distinguish them. In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, the Court established that it "had no
desire to resurrect the so-called Lochner era and the discredited prac-
tice of judicial disagreement with legislatively chosen policy ends. 700
Nollan illustrated the Court's view that regulatory takings require a
more in-depth means/ends connection than substantive due process
does. 701 This distinction merely emphasizes the importance of strong
takings jurisprudence and underscores its necessity as an area for pro-
tection from government intrusion.
Despite this and contrary to ruling authority, the First Circuit ap-
plied a very weak takings analysis in Phillip Morris JJ. 702 If the con-
flict between Mugler police power 70 3 and Pennsylvania Coal economic
impact considerations 70 4 is resolved as strongly in favor of police
power as that decision was, protections through the Takings Clause
will be substantially weakened. Furthermore, holding that the contin-
ued privilege of doing business in the state is just compensation under
Monsanto seems contradictory both to Monsanto and to the goals of
the Takings Clause. The impact of this decision reaches far beyond
Massachusetts. If fully implemented, 307B would effectively destroy
the tobacco companies' trade secrets, as the information would be eas-
ily accessible. Furthermore, numerous other industries would be at
risk to similar legislation. If the characterization of "legislative win-
dow-breaking" is correct, there is no reason to believe that states will
confine their targets to tobacco. 70 5 Other unpopular industries, such
as alcohol, firearms, and processed food would likely be subject to
similar destruction of their secrets, justifiable on public policy
grounds. 70 6 If allowing the parties to continue business is considered
adequate redress, compensation can almost always be avoided. For
these reasons, the Phillip Morris III decision is much too broad and
destructive.
Fortunately, the First Circuit recently withdrew that decision and
retreated from its broad protection of police power in Phillip Morris
IV. It is likely that this is due to the enormous corporate entities in-
700. Douglas W. Kmiec, Is the Jury In or Out in Deciding Regulatory- Takings Cases?, in I
PREVIEW U.S. SuP. CT. CASES 42. 45 (American Bar Association 1998) (citing Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
701. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
702. Phillip Morris 11, 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
703. See Mugler. 123 U.S. 623.
704. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
705. See Hur, supra note 567.
706. Id. at 450-51 (noting this possibility but then dismissing it because of the now-reversed
Phillip Morris II decision).
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volved and the Supreme Court's recent favorable treatment of pro-
tecting against economic regulation. 70 7 In Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, Ltd., the Court decided the proper division of liability determi-
nations between judge and jury for the first time.708 The Court upheld
the Ninth Circuit's decision and a $1.5 million verdict in holding that it
is the jury's function to decide the reasonableness of a regulatory tak-
ing.70 9 While obviously not an absolute jury right, expanding the
jury's role in regulatory takings is likely to increase favorable findings
on behalf of claimants. Citizens hold economic freedoms important
and resent government intrusion therein.
The First Circuit's withdrawal of its Phillip Morris III decision of-
fers litigants seeking protection of their economic rights a vestige of
hope. Phillip Morris IV more closely comports with the Supreme
Court's analysis of takings claims under Monsanto. The effect of this
decision is that Massachusetts is required to provide compensation
with real value to the plaintiffs. 710 Therefore, the government may
still enact the ingredient-reporting regulation, but it must provide the
plaintiffs with a benefit for destroying their trade secrets. Because the
nature of trade secrets is complex, identifying the proper value may be
difficult. The tobacco manufacturers involved in the Phillip Morris
decisions have major shares of the market, therefore, enormous sums
of money are at stake.
Phillip Morris IV is also likely to impact the amount and type of
regulations that other states pass. Hur's prediction that "legislative
window-breaking" will not become a prevalent problem may once
again ring true based on the Phillip Morris IV decision against height-
ened regulation of unfavorable industries. 71 l If Massachusetts at-
tempts certiorari, it is likely that the Supreme Court may grant
certiorari to apply the correct Monsanto analysis to such regulations
and clarify Takings Clause jurisprudence because of the vast interests
at stake and widespread impact of the decision on the tobacco
industry.
707. See generally City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687
(1999).
708. Id. (holding that a jury could reasonably decide that the City's rejection of plaintiff's
land development plan was a deprivation of property).
7(09. Id.
710. Phillip Morris I11, 267 F.3d at 63 (Selva. J.. dissenting).
711. See Hur. supra note 567.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the importance of economic liberties to a free marketplace,
corporations and individuals in the United States have never enjoyed
sound protections of these rights. Although the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause appears to be the most appropriate source for these rights,
it is an understatement to say that this intent has never been realized.
The recent Saenz decision provides both hope for restoration of that
clause, as well as reconstruction of the clauses harmed by its elimina-
tion. As with any large reconstruction, this will take time while the
Court strives to determine the scope the Framers envisioned for privi-
leges or immunities. Finding that privileges or immunities encompass
fundamental rights protections would be the most sound and secure
basis for rebirth of the clause.
Until that time, the Due Process Clause and Takings Clause must be
given increased weight. There is no justification for according the
Due Process Clause substance for personal liberties while eliminating
that option for economic rights. A more moderate less-restrictive-al-
ternative approach, together with economic measurements, can en-
sure judicial objectivity in the economic realm, where judicial values
may be less inflammatory. Furthermore, the Takings Clause can be
used to complement substantive due process, but must be given more
independent weight in intellectual property and trade secret contexts.
Compensation must actually hold value in order to be just. As Justice
Douglas recognized, economic liberties must be protected in order to
afford those opportunities to man that true freedom envisions.
Jessica E. Hacker*
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